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ABSTRACT
Through a collection of three integrated essays, this dissertation investigates how
institutional logics shape the way firms and their decision makers perceive, interpret, and
respond to political connectedness. More specifically, it elaborates on the cognitive
mechanisms through which institutional logics affect responses to political
connectedness. Essay 1 provides a fresh perspective to studying political connectedness
by showing how the differences in the interplay between multiple institutional logics
generate opposing logics – bureaucratic logic in developed countries vs. patrimonial logic
in emerging countries –, which lead to two dissimilar forms of firm-government
interaction across countries. Essay 2 proposes a new conceptual framework, institutional
sensemaking, which I develop by building on the institutional logics and sensemaking
literatures. This framework is used to investigate how bureaucratic logic and patrimonial
logic differently shape the way the expatriate managers make sense of and respond to
political connectedness in China. Essay 3 examines how managerial sensemaking affects
firms’ responses to dissimilar logics of firm-government interaction by looking at the
relationship between managers’ attention focus and their internationalization choices
regarding whether to expand into developed countries – where bureaucratic logic prevails
– or into emerging countries – where patrimonial logic prevails.
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CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW

My dissertation is organized as a collection of three integrated essays. Each of the three
essays has been developed to make contributions both to the institutional frameworks
used in international business and to our understanding of the international business
phenomena in emerging countries. Essay 1 is a perspective paper that proposes a new
lens to study political connectedness by drawing on the institutional logics perspective.
Essay 2 is a qualitative paper that develops the theory of institutional sensemaking of
political connectedness by integrating the institutional logics framework and the tripartite
sensemaking framework with the insights that I gained into the political connectedness
phenomenon during my field research in China. Essay 3 is an empirical paper that
examines the relationship between managerial sensemaking and firm’s strategic
responses to political connectedness through an analysis of panel data. Overall, my
dissertation comprises a new theoretical framework and two unique datasets: one
longitudinal and one cross-sectional obtained through interviews. Both of these datasets
have great potential to be used in numerous future studies.

1.1 Essay 1
In the first essay, entitled, What is the logic behind political connectedness?, I
explore the political connectedness phenomena in emerging countries by reviewing the
1

concerning international business research from an institutional logics perspective, by
which I identify the prevailing logics that shape firm-government interaction in
developed and emerging countries. In line with the extant international business research,
I conclude that prevailing logics in emerging countries and those in developed countries
are not different in degree, but rather different in kind (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Then I
build on the institutional logics perspective to provide a new perspective to studying
differences in firm-government interaction across countries. In this regard, I argue that
patrimonial logic is generated when weak logics of the market and the state blend with
the strong logics of the family and the community, which results in the prevalence of
patronage ties between firms and governments. Such patrimonial logic and the
consequent patronage ties exist in emerging countries to various extents. In developed
countries, on the other hand, market logic and state logic dominate the institutional
system, “insulating” the domain of firm-government relations against the logics of the
family and the community. This results in bureaucratic logic, which leads to the
prevalence of rule-based, impersonal exchanges between firms and governments. This
essay contributes to the international business literature on corruption, a deconstruction of
which in the essay reveals that our knowledge of firm-government interaction is to a large
extent shaped by Western bureaucratic logic, and hence fails to explain such a nonWestern phenomenon as political connectedness (Tsui, 2007).

1.2 Essay 2
In the second essay, entitled, Making sense of political connectedness: Corruption
or strategy?, I examine how institutional logics draw the boundary that separates
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legitimate exchanges between firms and governments from illegitimate ones. More
specifically, the essay shows how different institutional logics differently shape the way
managers make sense of and respond to political connectedness by integrating the
institutional logics framework and the tripartite sensemaking framework with the insights
gained into the political connectedness phenomenon in China through field research. In
this regard, I argue that under bureaucratic logic, managerial attention will be directed to
the legal and moral aspects of political connectedness. As a result, political
connectedness will be framed in negative terms, and managers will try to avoid political
connectedness. Under patrimonial logic, on the other hand, managerial attention will be
directed to the economic and relational aspects of political connectedness. As a result,
political connectedness will be framed in positive terms, and managers will try to
increase political connectedness.
Further, my field research in China shows that some expatriate managers have
actually been able to navigate in the Chinese institutional system by developing cognitive
complexity, which enables them not only to learn the patrimonial logic prevalent in their
host country, but also to blend it with the bureaucratic logic prevalent in their home
country. The consequent hybrid logic directs these managers’ attention to both legal and
moral aspects of political connectedness. As a result, they frame political connectedness
both in positive and in negative terms. In other words, those expatriate managers make
sense of political connectedness as a double-edged sword. In this regard, they find
political connectedness to be essential in order to operate in the Chinese institutional
system, and they do not think of it necessarily as corruption. However, they believe it can
turn into corruption depending on the nature of the political ties and on the way these ties
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are utilized. Therefore, although these managers essentially seek to increase political
connectedness to gain economic benefits in China, they avoid engaging in practices that
are blatantly illegal and blatantly immoral in their home country. In other words,
although they do not want to commit to the white area, at the same time they want to
avoid the black area. Thus, they end up navigating in the Chinese institutional system by
operating in the gray area, in which they find a balance between the two dissimilar logics.

1.2.1 Methodology
In the field research, I conducted interviews on expatriate managers in China, who
were all from countries in which bureaucratic logic is prevalent. In order to prompt
participants to talk such a sensitive topic as and political connectedness, I use a scenario
in the interviews as a stimulus material. The scenario is based on the corruption scandals
of JPMorgan, which routinely hired sons and daughters of government officials to win
government contracts (New York Times, 2013). By evaluating the behavior described in
the scenario, the participants reveal 1) what aspects of political connectedness they focus
their attention on (legal/moral aspects vs. economic/relational aspects), 2) how they
frame political connectedness (threat vs. opportunity), and finally 3) how their framings
influence their responses, including their likelihood to engage in political connectedness,
the solutions they propose, and their perceptions of the causes of political connectedness.
The interview data was analyzed by using NVivo software. The theory and the findings of
this research contribute to the institutional logics literature by elaborating on the
cognitive mechanisms by which logics affect firm’s responses. It also contributes to the
sensemaking literature by showing that the entire sensemaking process does not occur at
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the managerial level and independent of the environment, but is rather embedded in
institutions.

1.3 Essay 3
In the final essay, entitled, Institutional logics, managerial sensemaking, and
internationalization strategy, I examine how managerial sensemaking shapes firm’s
responses to dissimilar logics of firm-government interaction by looking at the
relationship between managerial attention to firm’s external environment and firm’s
internationalization strategies.
Drawing on the managerial sensemaking literature (Daft et al., 1988; Nadkarni &
Barr, 2008), I argue that managers either focus their attention on the market environment
or on the institutional environment. I also propose that such differences in scanning
emphasis will affect whether dissimilar institutional logics such as patrimonial logic are
framed by managers either as a threat or an opportunity, which in turn will affect their
internationalization choices such as whether expand into developed countries, in which
bureaucratic logic prevails, or into emerging countries, in which patrimonial logic
prevails. Analysis of the panel data shows that managerial attention to the market
environment is positively associated with firm expansion into developed countries,
whereas managerial attention to the institutional environment is positively associated
with firm expansion into emerging countries,. Thus, the essay contributes to the
institutional explanations of internationalization strategy by demonstrating the cognitive
underpinnings of internationalization strategy.

5

1.3.1 Methodology
This essay uses a panel of 152 U.S. manufacturing firms operating in global
industries from 2003 to 2007 to test the arguments. The sample is limited to global
industries only because firms within such industries pursue global strategies. The
implication is that the market environment and the economic environment should be
paramount for the decision makers of these firms, whereas institutional differences across
countries should not draw considerable attention. If the results of this study support this
argument for firms in global industries, however, then the findings can be easily
generalized to firms in other industries, as managers in multi-domestic and transnational
industries are under more pressures to adapt their strategies to local contexts, and hence
are more likely to focus their attention on the institutional discrepancies between
countries.
Following the extant sensemaking literature (Levy, 2005; Nadkarni et al., 2011), I
use CEO’s letters to shareholders published in the annual reports to elicit data for
managerial sensemaking. I collect annual reports from Mergent Web Reports, as well as
from firms’ official websites. I was able to locate as much as 537 letters. Another 223
letters either could not be located or were not published. I obtain data regarding attention
by using word counts from CEO’s letters to shareholders published in annual reports.
Word count has been typically employed in several studies to measure managerial
sensemaking (Kaplan, 2008; Levy, 2005). Following Kaplan (2008), I develop a coding
list mostly from the ground up. I select the phrases and words referring to different
domains of the external environments after manually coding several letters from all the
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industries represented in the sample. After the coding list was complete, I used NVivo to
conduct automated coding on the whole sample.

7

Table 1.1: Dissertation overview
Essay 1: What’s the
logic behind political
connectedness?

Theoretical
foundations

Institutional logics

Data

Perspective

Content analysis

Analytical
techniques
Theoretical
contributions

Essay 2: Making
sense of political
connectedness:
Corruption or
strategy?
Institutional logics,
managerial
sensemaking
Transcribed interview
texts

Provides a fresh
perspective in
studying political
connectedness by
explaining how
different interplays
among multiple logics
differently shape
firm-government
interaction across
countries.

Shows how different
institutional logics
differently shape
managerial
sensemaking and
responses to political
connectedness.
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Essay 3: Institutional
logics, managerial
sensemaking, and
internationalization
strategy
Institutional logics,
managerial
sensemaking
Longitudinal database,
CEO’s letters to
shareholders
Automated word count,
negative binomial
regression
Demonstrates how
managerial attention
affects strategic
responses to dissimilar
institutional logics of
firm-government
interaction by shaping
internationalization
choices regarding
whether to expand into
developed countries or
into emerging
countries.

CHAPTER 2
WHAT IS THE LOGIC BEHIND POLITICAL CONNECTEDNESS?

“Some call it gratuities. Some call them questionable payments. Some
call it extortion. Some call it grease. Some call it bribery. I look at these
payments as necessary to sell a product. I never felt I was doing
anything wrong.” (New York Times, 2008)
Carl Kotchian, former chief operating officer (COO) and vice chairman of
Lockheed reflected his bitterness in this way in a 1977 profile in the New York Times, at
the Lockheed directors who ousted him from his positions in 1976 based on his $38
million of “questionable payments”. He admitted paying millions of dollars over more
than a decade to the Dutch, Japanese and West German politicians, to Italian officials and
generals, and to other highly placed figures from Hong Kong to Saudi Arabia, in order to
guarantee contracts for military aircrafts. This led to tremendous political upheaval in
these countries in the 1970s: Japan's prime minister was jailed, the Italian President
resigned, The Dutch Queen threatened to abdicate, etc.
Mr. Kotchian’s confessions generated such a backlash in several countries
because the payments he admitted making were considered as bribes, which are deemed
unjustifiable on many grounds; e.g., from an economic perspective, they skew the
allocation of resources and hence hinder economic development (Brouthers, Gao, &
McNicol, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Mauro, 1995; Schleifer & Vishny, 1993); from a
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legal standpoint, they are illegal and hence undermine the rule of law (Bardhan, 1997;
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Kaufmann, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Spencer & Gomez,
2011). However, Mr. Kotchian never admitted paying a bribe. Although he admitted
paying government officials around the world to purchase his company’s products, he
maintained that those payments comprised a necessary part of an exchange between a
corporation and a government. This raises questions such as “what constitutes a bribe?”,
and “how do we distinguish a bribe from a legitimate exchange between firm and the
government?”
Research on corruption and political connectedness in international business is yet
to address these questions (Svensson, 2005). In this regard, most studies have not sought
to elaborate on the principle or set of principles that distinguish a legitimate exchange
between a firm and a government from an illegitimate one (Harstad & Svensson, 2011).
Instead, the boundary that separates between legitimate and illegitimate exchanges in
researchers’ countries – developed countries – has been taken for granted, and was
imposed on countries – emerging countries – whose institutions are fundamentally
dissimilar in kind (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Tsui, 2007). In this regard, personalized
exchanges between firms and governments that transcend beyond the legitimate
practices of influence-buying such as lobbying and campaign contributions is labeled as
corruption. As a result, most research have ended up applying rational-legal and
economic standards to the issue (Bardhan, 1997), and have not accounted for; 1) the
cognitive/symbolic elements by which people define a legitimate exchange, i.e. the
elements by which people give meaning to a particular action or practice (Coleman,
1990); 2) the cross-country variations in these cognitive/symbolic elements, which may
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shift the definitions of a legitimate exchange and make different types of action or
practice “rational” or “normal” in different countries (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Witt &
Redding, 2009). In this paper, I fill these voids by addressing two research questions:

Research question 1: How is the boundary that separates legitimate and
illegitimate exchanges between firms and governments in a society drawn?
Research question 2: How does this boundary differ across countries?

I aim to answer to these questions by drawing on the institutional logics
perspective (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012).
Institutional logics are defined as “overarching sets of principles that prescribe how to
interpret organizational reality, what constitutes appropriate behavior, and how to
succeed (Thornton, 2004: 70). Logics, in other words, provide guidelines on how to
interpret and function in social situations (Greenwood et al., 2011: 318). The notion of
institutional multiplicity or complexity in this perspective suggests that society is
constituted through multiple institutional logics, each of whom governs an institutional
order, such as the market, state, family, community, religion, etc. The logic of each
institutional order differentially shapes the meanings that people give to the situations
they face (Thornton et al., 2012). The logics of these institutional orders “are
interdependent, and yet also contradictory” (Friedland & Alford, 1991: 250). In this
regard, multiple institutional logics that are available to actors can interact and compete
for influence in all societal domains (Nigam & Ocasio, 2010). As a result, the logic of
one domain can be transposed to another domain and infuse the same practice with a
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different meaning. Therefore, paying government officials to win government contracts
may be considered as grease, or a breach of law, or kin loyalty, or a reciprocal obligation,
depending on which logic is applied to make sense of the issue. Based on this, I argue
that it is the outcome of the interplay among multiple institutional logics in a given
context that determines how corporate actors draw the boundary separating legitimate
and illegitimate exchanges between firms and governments.
As for the second research question, I argue that in many emerging countries,
weak logics of the market and the state blend with the strong logics of the family and the
community to generate patrimonial logic, which results in the prevalence of patronage
ties between firms and governments. In developed countries, on the other hand, market
logic and state logic dominate the institutional system, “insulating” the domain of firmgovernment relations against the logics of the family and the community. This results in
bureaucratic logic, which leads to the prevalence of rule-based, impersonal exchanges
between firms and governments.

2.1 Institutional logics
Institutional logics are defined as “overarching sets of principles that prescribe
how to interpret organizational reality, what constitutes appropriate behavior, and how to
succeed (Thornton, 2004: 70). Logics, in other words, shape individual and
organizational behavior by providing guidelines on how to interpret and function in
certain situations (Greenwood et al., 2011: 318). Although the institutional logics
perspective (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012) has long been used in
management scholarship, its application in international business research has remained
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limited. I employ institutional logics framework as the base theoretical foundation for this
essay for three reasons.
First, the institutional logics perspective is based on the premise that institutions
comprise both material and symbolic elements. Structures and practices materialize the
ideas represented by symbols, while symbols give meaning to these structures and
practices (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Zilber, 2008). This suggests that structures and
common practices that constitute the business environment in emerging countries cannot
be understood without their underlying meanings. For example, political connectedness
may be corruption in developed countries, but it may be a non-market capability in
emerging countries. In this regard, the institutional logics approach complements the
social perspective in international business, which focuses solely on the observable
material aspects of institutions and attaches a priori meanings to them.
Second, international business literature typically emphasizes either economic or
social aspects of institutions. In this regard, the economic view focuses on the incentive
structures determined by institutions, while the latter stresses the isomorphic pressures
exerted by institutions, to explain responses to emerging country institutions. Yet, the
institutional logics perspective suggests that actors can be motivated by both economic
and social considerations (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012).
Organizations and individuals comply with logics to gain not only social endorsement but
also economic benefits. Incorporation of logics does not make actors only legitimate, but
also competitive (Thornton, 2002). This view thus has the potential to bridge the gap
between the economic and social views in international business.
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Finally, the institutional logics perspective suggests that organizational and
individual sensemaking are nested within institutions that are simultaneously constraining
and enabling (Thornton et al., 2012). Institutions constrain sensemaking in the sense that
the interests, identities and assumptions of actors are embedded in prevailing institutional
logics. In this respect, logics are rule-like, socially shared understandings that form the
cognitive underpinnings of existing social structures and common practices. At the same
time, institutional logics enable sensemaking in the sense that they provide actors with
the opportunities to elaborate on and develop prevailing institutional logics. In this
respect, institutional logics are toolkits that can be used by actors. This suggests that the
way firms and decision makers respond to political connectedness can vary depending on
the logic they use to make sense of it. For example, managers of a developed country
firm can make sense of political connectedness as a non-market capability if they learn
patrimonial logic and apply it to the firm-government context in emerging countries.
Institutional logics perspective is based on the notion of institutional complexity,
i.e. institutions are composed of multiple and competing logics that simultaneously
coexist, and that are interdependent on each other (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Kostova &
Zaheer, 1999; Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008; Kraatz & Block, 2008). Each institutional
order represents a governance style that shape individual and organizational preferences
and interests and the repertoire of behaviors by which interests and preferences are
attained within the sphere of influence of that order (Frederick & Alford, 1991: 232).
Table 2.1 represents how individuals and organizations, if influenced by any one
institutional order, are likely to understand their sense of self and identity, i.e. who they
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are, their logics of action, how they act, their vocabularies of motive, and what language
is salient, etc.
The notion of institutional complexity explains heterogeneity in behavior and
associated meanings not only across domains in a given society but also across societies.
In this respect, we observe a variety of practices and meanings in a particular domain
when different institutional orders come into play to different extents across countries. In
other words, divergent practices are observed among countries because a variety of logics
are applied, or transposed, to provide people with cognitive and behavioral guidelines.
For example, bureaucratic nation-state, and consequently state logic, exists everywhere,
but what it is and what it should do depend on its interactions with other institutional
logics in a society. It can be argued that governments in developed countries are
generally functional, i.e. they are to provide technical solutions to economic problems,
such as supporting markets to sustain economic development. Governments in these
countries are believed to play a crucial role in facilitating market exchange, as suggested
by the World Bank governance indicators1 (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobaton, 1999),
all of which concern state’s capacity to support a modern market system. This notion of
state is heavily influenced by market logic that is concerned with creating perfect, or selfregulated, markets, which is believed to result in utility maximization at the societal level
and hence in increased social well-being. In emerging countries, on the other hand, state
may have different functions. In Gulf countries, for example, paternalistic states led by
sheikhs are responsible for looking after their subjects, who are supposed to show loyalty
to their ruler in return. In this respect, a huge majority of citizens in these countries are
employed by state organizations and state-owned enterprises. This indicates that the state
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in such countries is theorized more as a family – or a tribe – comprised of network of
individuals – i.e. family logic – or groups, than as a bureaucratic organization – i.e. state
logic (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to expect
the government in these countries to be governed more by family logic than state logic.
This sort of interplay among logics should also influence the way firm-government
relations occur, which will be discussed in the following section.
The concept of inter-institutional system was first introduced by Friedland and
Alford (1991), whose purpose was to identify the central institutions of the contemporary
Western societies. In this regard, they identified capitalist market, bureaucratic state,
democracy, nuclear family, and Christianity as the pillars that shape preferences,
interests, and behavior in those societies. This conceptualization was first modified by
Thornton (2004), and subsequently by Thornton et al. (2012). The aim of these authors
differed from that of Friedland and Alford (1991) in the sense that they sought to advance
the theory of institutional logics by making it suitable for empirical inquiry through the
development of a typology of ideal types (Thornton et al., 2012), rather than identifying
the central institutional orders in a particular society or societies. To this end, Thornton et
al. identified seven institutional orders: family, community, religion, state, market,
profession, and corporation.
The strategies, values and economic systems associated with each order represent
ideal types, i.e. they are unlikely to apply to any particular research context. However, the
notion of institutional complexity suggests that behavior is determined not by the logic of
one institutional order, but by how logics of different institutional orders come into play
in a particular context. In this sense, all ideal types exist in every society to different
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extents, and in different interactions with each other. Therefore, the way that logics of
ideal types blend is what causes heterogeneity across time and space. Based on the extant
literature, I identify four institutional orders, or ideal types, that shape behavior in the
domain of firm-government interaction: market (Lui, 1985; Tanzi, 1998), state (Collins,
1980; Polanyi, 2001), family (Roth, 1968; Weber, 1968) and community (Budd, 2004;
Fukuyama, 2011). I argue that the different blending of these four orders explain
variations across countries in the way government-business relations take place.

2.1.1 Market logic
This logic is concerned with the activities human undertake in order to conduct
exchange in the most efficient manner (Friedland & Alford, 1991). According to this,
individuals’ behavior is a consequence of independent, rational choices they make based
on the objective assessments of their interests (Smith, 1776).
Market logic and firm-government interaction. Under market logic, self-regulated
market is the perfect resource allocation mechanism through which both individual and
social welfare can be achieved (Friedman 1962; Smith, 1776; Stigler, 1971). This regards
the effect of any non-market element on exchange as an interference that disrupts the
market and consequently hurts economic performance. As mentioned before, some
economists who apply market logic to firm-government interaction attribute corruption to
existence of the regulatory state (Stigler, 1971; Tanzi, 1988). The implication of this for
firm-government interaction is that the degree of insertion of the regulatory state in the
market leads to corruption (Bardhan, 1997).
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However, many economists reject the notion of perfect markets. As Friedman
(1962) states, markets work as long as transactions are voluntary and informed, but
markets alone do not have any mechanisms to ensure this. Therefore, he argues that
markets work only if states make and enforce the rules that enforce contracts, define
property rights, and facilitate information sharing. North (1990) goes further and argues
that market activities are shaped by not only formal, but also by informal rules. Many
social science researchers similarly criticized market logic for focusing narrowly on the
market and ignoring the other logics embedded in the broad institutional and social
structures that shape market activities (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Friedland & Alford,
1991; Granovetter, 1985; North, 1990; Polanyi, 2001).
From an institutional logics approach, it can be argued that market logic alone
cannot influence behavior. Though it may be the dominant logic in one context, other
institutional orders may still have potential impact on judgment and behavior. Not every
human activity can be converted into a commodity that has a monetary price and that can
be exchanged in the market among rational utility maximizing individuals (Friedland &
Alford, 1991). Other institutional orders generate symbolic utilities such as values. These
are absolute utilities; not only they do not have explicit price, but they also cannot be
traded off against each other. The implication is that, firms’ strategic choices regarding
how to deal with governments are not contingent on some objective assessments of
utility, but are rather contingent on the whole inter-institutional system (Friedland &
Alford, 1991). In other words, the rationality and legitimacy of an exchange between
firms and governments is defined and shaped by the ongoing interaction among all
institutional orders, not by the market forces alone.
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2.1.2 State logic
This logic concerns the regulation and coordination of human activity through
bureaucratic hierarchies, with the aim of increasing social well-being (Friedland &
Alford, 1991; Weber, 1968). Bureaucratized state, the paramount actor in state logic, is
based on specialized professional administrators and on a law made and applied by fulltime professional jurists for a populace characterized by rights of citizenship (Weber,
1968; Collins, 1980).
The emergence of state logic dates back to the rise of the bureaucratic states in the
late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century (Collins, 1980). Before that, legal systems were
characterized by patrimonial or magical-religious procedures, by differential application
to different social groups and by different localities, and by the practices of officials
seeking private gain (: 930). The rise of bureaucratic state, however, led to the
enforcement of written laws which ascribed culpability to the individual rather than
groups (Friedland & Alford, 1991). In this sense, bureaucratic state constituted the
individual as an abstract legal subject with rights –specified independently of social
structure – before the law, responsible for his or her actions (: 239).
State logic and firm-government interaction. Through rationally calculable and
universally applied system of law courts, state logic strictly separates between private and
public spheres, in other words, between state and society, thereby inhibiting arbitrary
political interference with markets (Collins, 1980; Friedland & Alford, 1991). In this
regard, all exchanges between firms and governments are supposed to be strictly rulebased. Any personal discretion used by a government official represents a violation of the
core principles of state logic, and hence under state logic, i.e. under the ideal type of state
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institutional order, any personalized exchange between firms and governments are seen
as illegitimate, and labeled as corruption.
A big problem emerges when state logic is transposed to understand firmgovernment interaction in emerging countries. Although we see some elements of state
logic in these countries, it is not strong enough in the institutional system to impose a
rational-legal order. The notion of bureaucratic states that attempt to convert diverse
individual situations into the basis for routine official decisions (Friedland & Alford,
1991: 249), does not necessarily apply to the context of emerging countries.
Consequently, we should see a shift in the boundary that defines legitimate exchanges
between firms and governments where emerging countries are considered. This will be
discussed in more detail in the subsequent sections of the paper.

2.1.3 Family logic
The logic of the family is the motivation of human activity through unconditional
loyalty with the aim of increasing family reputation and honor (Friedland & Alford,
1991). In this regard, families attempt to convert all social relations into unconditional
obligations oriented to meet collective needs. Patriarchalism, which Weber (1968)
defines as the authority of a master over his household, epitomizes how this logic shapes
governance. Patriarchal rulers need no bureaucratic machinery to enforce their policies.
They rather depend on the willingness of their subjects to obey their “father”, who
protects and provides for his “children”, and who elevates the status of the whole family
in return.
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Family logic and firm-government interaction. In developed countries, the
unconditional loyalties which are the ideal of familial relations do not provide a
legitimate model for economic behavior. In fact, the logic of the family is allowed to
influence economic behavior only on the margins of Western societies, such as the Mafia,
or small businesses that are rooted in immigrant communities (Fukuyama, 1996; Tan &
Peng, 2002). Once such practices are spotted, they are regarded as deviant,
traditionalistic, and even pathological (Friedland & Alford, 1991). In emerging countries,
however, it is widely recognized that allegiance to kinship-based or clan-based loyalties
often takes precedence over self-interest and formal rules (Bardhan, 1997, Budd, 2004;
Fukuyama, 2011; Roth, 1968; Theobald, 1982; Uricoechea, 1980). Under such
circumstances, it may be “rational” for people to continue to exchange with those who
they are related with, to the exclusion of others, even though there are more profitable
alternatives.
The situation described above is not limited to exchanges within the market, but
also applies to exchanges between firms and governments. In the West, where legal
standards – state logic – are applied to such exchanges, anonymous bureaucratic rules
strictly regulate the relations between government and business. In developing countries,
however, where legal standards are subdued by relational norms – or when state logic is
subdued by family logic –, exchanges between business and government become
personalized. Under these circumstances, use of public resources to cater to particularistic
loyalties becomes quite common and routinely expected (Bardhan, 1997: 1330). For
example, a common aphorism in some pre-1989 Soviet-dominated societies urged that
“those who do not steal from the state steal from their families” (Misangyi et al., 2008:
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753). This suggests that to the extent that exchanges between firms and governments are
not subject to the formal rule of law, they are likely to be subject to the informal rules of
relational obligations. It is this characteristic of developing countries that makes
personalized, relationship-based exchanges between firms and governments “rational”,
and “legitimate”.

2.1.4 Community logic
Contemporary communities approach (O'Mahony and Lakhani, 2011) defines
community as “a group of people who coalesce around any number of identity sources”.
This definition includes communities ranging from local communities, socio-political
movements, religious groups, social classes, diaspora, etc. The logic of all these
communities is based on the motivation of human activity through reciprocal obligations
with the aim of increasing the status of the community (Thornton et al., 2012).
Community logic and firm-government interaction. Individual behavior in a
community is aimed at serving collective interests by forming relational networks with
other members (Thornton et al., 2012). Such relationships are not based on self-interest,
but rather on trust and reciprocity among members. They are not governed by the formal
rule of law, but rather by informal group norms and values. As a result, community logic
shapes behavior quite differently from market logic and state logic. The implication for
firm-government interaction is that if community logic prevails over state logic, then
exchanges between firms and governments will be shaped by the informal norms that are
embedded in the relational networks rather than by the formal rules. Thus, the influence
of community logic in an institutional system is likely to lead to informal ties between
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firms and governments. In short, the arguments made for the role of family logic in
emerging countries can be made also for community logic. The difference between
family logic and community logic is that the former concerns unconditional obligations
based on kinship and clanship, whereas the latter is related to reciprocal obligations based
on a shared identity (Bardhan, 1997; Fukuyama, 2011). In this regard, the influence of
community logic in an institutional system is likely to lead to horizontal networks
between firms and governments, or so-called cronyism, whereas that of family logic is
likely result in vertical networks between firms and governments, or so-called patronclient relationships, or patronage ties.

2.1.5 Blending institutional logics
As explained before, the notion of institutional complexity in the institutional
logics perspective suggests that multiple logics simultaneously exist and shape behavior
(Thornton et al., 2012). In this sense, it is likely that firm-government interaction in a
particular context is guided by multiple logics.
For example, the modern market system that exists in developed countries is
governed by a blend of market and state logics. In this regard, market – as we know it –
needs a strong bureaucratic state in order to function. As Friedman (1962) argues, free
markets cannot exist without a state. State’s duties in this regard include maintaining law
and order, defining property rights, adjudicating disputes about the interpretation of the
rules, enforcing contracts, promoting competition, providing a monetary framework, etc
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Kaufman, 1997; Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Kim, Kim, &
Hoskisson, 2010; North, 1990; Peng, 2003). After all, it was the state logic that provided

23

the basis for a reliable system of banking, investment, property, and contracts, and set the
stage for the industrial revolution in the first place (Collins, 1980). It was the strong
bureaucratic states of the West that formed the institutional underpinnings of markets,
and hence created Polanyi (2001) similarly argues that the modern market system –
market logic – cannot be understood independent of the modern nation-state – state logic.
In this regard, he gives a very detailed historical study of how markets, which did not
exist prior to the Industrial Revolution, were created for the first time. In the 18th century
British statesmen, who were informed by the theories of classical economists – i.e.
market logic –, tried to create an economic system based on the notion of self-regulated
markets. Though created and sustained by state logic, this system was thought to be
independent of the state and society – in line with market logic. After market came to be
successful with the Industrial Revolution in Britain, market logic spread throughout the
world. In short, market – and its logic –, is not a natural phenomenon that has existed
since the beginning of humanity, but rather a superimposition by the British State on its
society in the 18th century (Collins, 1980; Polanyi, 2001). The implication is that market
logic cannot take roots unless state logic is already developed. In this sense, a strong state
logic may not necessarily lead to strong market logic, but is a prerequisite for it (CuervoCazurra & Dau, 2009; Kaufman et al., 1999; Williamson, 2004).
Another example that shows how different logics interact with each other is the
guanxi-based gift-economy, i.e. gifts in return for a favor. Despite seemingly being a
simple market exchange, gift is more than a commodity in the practice of guanxi, because
it is not independent of the social relationship in which it is exchanged (Yang, 1989). In
this respect, Yang argues that the practice of guanxi is rooted in a culturally specific
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relational conception of the person, where identities are constructed through the
internalization of others' judgments. Guanxi thus depends upon creating identities,
whatever the basis, between people such that norms of mutual obligation can be
activated. Gift giving is an aggressive material and symbolical construction of
commonality of insideness, from which obligation logically flows (Friedland & Alford,
1991: 258–259). Put in this way, guanxi-based gift giving reflects a community logic that
aims to increase the community’s status by creating a common identity and reciprocal
obligations between members. This is distinct from market logic that is based on
impersonal, one-time exchanges. Yet, this is not to argue that guanxi-based gift-giving
does not include any elements of market logic. It is not realistic to assume that parties of
such an exchange are not driven by self-interest whatsoever. Yet, interests and how to
maximize them are shaped by the interaction between market logic and community logic,
rather than the former alone. In this sense, Chinese people are not necessarily repulsed by
the notion of self-interest, but the blend of market logic and community logic provides
them a different understanding of self-interest, as well as of how to achieve it.

2.2 Legitimacy of exchanges between firms and governments

2.2.1 Corruption
When used in the domain of firm-government interaction, the word corruption
refers to an illegitimate exchange between a firm and the government. Thus, we need to
look at how corruption is defined and studied if we want to understand how the boundary
that separates between legitimate and illegitimate exchanges is drawn. In this regard,
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research on corruption has been dominated by two perspectives. A careful reading of
these perspectives reveals that they embody three logics. One perspective is solely
concerned with the role of rational self-interest and efficiency pressures, and is thus
dominated by market logic (Klitgaard, 1988; Leff, 1989; Lui, 1985; Tanzi, 1998). The
other perspective deals with the regulation of corruption through both disciplinary market
forces and law, and hence is more influenced by a blend of market and state logics
(Bardhan, 1997; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Kaufmann, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Mauro,
1995; Schleifer & Vishny, 1993).
The first perspective applies market logic to the issue of corruption. In other
words, actors are considered to engage in corruption simply because they have incentives
do so. One stream of research in this perspective even suggests that the presence of the
state distorts supply and demand, while corruption is a mechanism that equalizes it (Leff,
1989; Lui, 1985). According to this, it is the state that creates the motivation for
corruption by impeding free markets. This point is bluntly illustrated by Tanzi (1998): “If
we abolish the state, we abolish corruption” (: 566). Overall, this perspective sees
corruption either as a way to overcome excessive regulatory burdens that inhibit markets
to operate, or as an incentive for the government officials to work harder. The former
argument is usually applied to developing countries in which state intervention is an
issue, whereas the latter applies to developed countries too (Mauro, 1995). Such
arguments clearly epitomize market logic.
State logic constitutes the origin of a definition of corruption that is commonly
used in research and practice: “Abuse of public power for private gain”. This definition is
widely adopted by the literature (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Kaufmann, 1997; Schleifer &
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Vishny, 1993; Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005; Spencer & Gomez, 2011;
Svensson, 2005; Treisman, 2000; Voyer & Beamish, 2004), and is also officially adopted
by the World Bank, as well as Transparency International. The term “abuse of public
power”, of course, typically constitutes a breach of rule of law, and hence involves
applying a rational-legal standard to the issue (Misangyi et al., 2008; Svensson, 2005).
Thus, it can be argued that the lens through which we view, explain, and address
corruption, is rooted in state logic. The approach of International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) to corruption epitomizes this. In this regard, the organization sees corruption as a
serious threat to the government’s ability to establish and maintain order, and hence a
factor that dramatically increases country risk:
“…insidious sorts of corruption are potentially of much greater risk to
foreign business in that they can lead to popular discontent, unrealistic and
inefficient controls on the state economy, and encourage the development
of the black market.
The greatest risk in such corruption is that at some time it will become so
overweening, or some major scandal will be suddenly revealed, as to
provoke a popular backlash, resulting in a fall or overthrow of the
government, a major reorganizing or restructuring of the country's
political institutions, or, at worst, a breakdown in law and order, rendering
the country ungovernable.” (ICRG, 2013)
Most studies on corruption, however, represent a blend of state logic and market
logic, regarding corruption as a rational, self-interested behavior, conducted by persons
who use their discretion to direct allocations to themselves or to other social actors who
offer rewards in return for favorable discretionary treatment (Bardhan, 1997; Kaufmann,
1997; Rose-Ackerman, 2001; Schleifer & Vishny, 1993). Thus, the second perspective
assumes that corruption is a rational utility maximizing response to situations that present
opportunities for gain and the discretionary power to appropriate that gain (Misangyi et
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al., 2008: 751). In this regard, corruption is thought to be best remedied both by curtailing
discretionary power – e.g. strengthening rule of law, which is a manifestation of state
logic – (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; La Porta et al., 1999; Mauro, 1995; Voyer & Beamish,
2004), and by incentives to avoid corrupt activities – e.g. increasing government
officials’ wages (Klitgaard, 1988), which is a manifestation of market logic. In addition
to this, an influential stream of research within this perspective is based on the view that
laws determine the level of corruption in a society indirectly by shaping incentive
structures (Kaufmann, 1997; Schleifer & Vishny, 1993), e.g. strictly enforced laws
increase the cost of corruption and hence deter people from engaging in it.
However, corruption is a complex phenomenon and understanding and changing a
corrupt system requires a more holistic view. Institutional logics approach tells us that the
institutional system is not confined to the logic of either the market or the state, but rather
is composed of several orders. It may be true that it is predominantly market and state
logics that influence actors’ cognitive and behavioral repertoires in the West, but in other
countries, different logics may be in play. As a result, practice that is perceived as a
corrupt transaction in the West, may be interpreted as loyalty or as reciprocal obligation
in other countries, which may increase the prevalence of that practice in those countries.
This holistic view of corruption is in line with the neo-institutional approach to
corruption in international business, which takes into consideration the factors beyond the
market and the state. In this regard, Spencer and Gomez (2011) demonstrate that when
multinationals’ managers perceive that a corrupt practice such as bribery has become
institutionalized in a society, they are more likely to conform to those societal
expectations to obtain legitimacy. Similarly, Collins and Uhlenbruck (2004) found
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empirical evidence that managers in India who perceived corruption to reflect ‘the way
things are done’ locally were more likely to engage in corrupt practices, even when they
personally viewed them negatively. Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) show that multinationals’
subsidiaries engage in corruption in highly corrupt countries in order to be congruent
with local institutions. Despite extending the view on corruption by taking into
consideration the domains other than the market and the state, this literature in
international business has neglected to conceptualize corruption. Those scholars rather
took the Western definition of corruption for granted, and applied it to emerging country
contexts, assuming that multinationals either challenge or conform to the universally
defined “corrupt” practices they face in emerging countries. As a result, the literature
failed to address how multinationals and their decision makers draw the boundary that
separates between legitimate and illegitimate exchanges.
As explained earlier, however, the definition of corruption is to a large extent
shaped by state logic, which makes a clear distinction between legalized exchanges
between firms and government such as campaign contributions and the illegal ones such
as bribery. Since state logic is much weaker in emerging countries than in the West, the
principles used to distinguish legitimate exchanges from illegitimate ones in those
countries are likely to be different. Thus, we should expect to see different forms of
exchanges between firms and governments than these two. In fact, many international
business scholars argue that political connectedness, i.e. inter-personal ties between
corporate and political actors, is the most common form of firm-government interaction
in emerging countries (Peng & Heath, 1996; Shi, Markoczy, & Stan, 2014; Wan, 2005).
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2.2.2 Political connectedness
International Country Risk Guide (2013) does not provide a definition of political
connectedness but merely identifies it as a form of corruption: “Political connections
represent a type of corruption, taking such forms as excessive patronage, nepotism, job
reservations, 'favor-for-favors', or secret party funding”. Yet, literature on political
connectedness separates from the general corruption literature. This suggests that
political connectedness is a distinct phenomenon from corruption.
Peng and Luo (2000) define political ties as individual connections with officers
at various levels of government. Faccio (2006), in her pioneering empirical study on
political connectedness around the world, defines a company as politically connected if
“at least one of its large shareholders – anyone controlling at least 10 percent of voting
shares – or one of its top officers – i.e. CEO, president, vice-president, chairman, or
secretary – is a member of parliament, a minister, or is closely related to a top politician
or party.” (: 369). Similarly, Sun, Mellahi, and Wright (2012) define political connections
as “boundary-spanning personal and institutional linkages between firms and the
constituent parts of public authorities.” (: 68). All these definitions suggest that political
connectedness involves a long-term interpersonal relationship as opposed to a one-time
exchange, which has been the main focus of the general corruption literature.
This aspect of political connectedness is also supported by the empirical work.
Fisman (2001) demonstrates that politically well-connected firms in Indonesia lost more
market value in reaction to the adverse rumors about the state of President Suharto's
health than firms that are less connected. Similarly, Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006)
show that firms have difficulty re-establishing connections with a new government when
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their patron falls from power, leading closely connected firms to underperform under the
new regime. Siegel (2007) reports that Korean firms’ network ties to the political regime
increases their cross-border alliance activity, while their network ties to the enemies of
the political regime decreases it. These empirical studies demonstrate that political
connectedness concerns long-term and personal relationships embedded in the political
system, and such relationships cannot be easily formed or abandoned, as opposed to
impersonal exchanges, which are transient and business oriented in nature.
However, most studies do not elaborate on the nature of those relationships,
despite some notable exceptions, such as Siegel (2007) and Sun et al. (2012). In this
regard, the implicit assumption in most of the literature is that the parties build and
maintain these relationships primarily because they benefit from them (Peng, 2003). This
understanding embodies market logic that presumes rational behavior informed by the
principles of utility maximization. Similarly, the literature influenced by state logic does
not recognize relationships occurring outside the formal rules and roles. It does not
distinguish corruption from political connectedness, and labels the exchanges that are
facilitated by personal ties between firms and governments as corruption (CuervoCazurra, 2006; Kaufmann, 1997; Rodriguez et al., 2005). Therefore, we need to look at
other institutional logics such as family logic and community logic, in order to
understand the boundaries that separate legitimate exchanges between firms and
governments from the illegitimate ones in emerging countries. This paper is a step
towards this direction.
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2.3 The logic behind political connectedness
It is very well known that firms and governments are interconnected all over the
world (Faccio, 2006). This includes the developed countries where state is largely
withdrawn from the market, such as Canada, and the U.K. Business-government relations
are believed to be very important for U.S. businesses too (Fisman et al., 2012). Otherwise
there would not be 12,503 lobbyists in Washington D.C. (Reuters, 2009), the heart a
political system that seemingly champions market logic at the expense of state logic
around the world. In this sense, we can look at firm-government interaction as a universal
phenomenon.
Yet, this is not to say that this interconnection is attained and utilized in the same
manner globally. As explained before, most research on political connectedness has
looked at informal ties in emerging countries. There is little evidence suggesting that
business-government interaction in developed countries may also be facilitated by
informal ties. In this regard, Fisman et al. (2012) examined U.S. firms’ political ties to
Vice President Dick Cheney. They estimated the value of these ties for firms precisely as
zero, meaning that firms did not benefit from being connected to Dick Cheney. The
conclusion drawn from this finding is that personal ties to politicians do not yield value to
firms in the U.S. Fisman et al. attributed this to the existence of formal control
mechanisms that regulate government-business relations in the U.S. In short, the study
suggests that firms cannot leverage informal political ties in countries whose formal
institutions are strong.
On the other hand, research on political connectedness in emerging countries
indicates that both the prevalence and the utility of political connectedness are much
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higher in these countries. Siegel (2007) shows that networks with the political regime
increased the rate at which Korean companies formed cross-border strategic alliances.
Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven (2008) find that Brazilian firms which provided
contributions to elected federal deputies experienced higher stock returns than firms that
did not. Peng and Luo (2000) document that managers’ ties with politicians in China
increase firm performance. Yiu and Lau (2008) report that network ties with the
government in China increases the intensity of firms’ engagement in corporate
entrepreneurial activities, which in turn increases firms’ relative performance. Yiu, Lau,
and Bruton (2007) show that political network ties in China positively affect international
venturing.
Overall, the literature regards political connectedness as a rational and interestseeking response to the existing formal institutional arrangements in a country.
Specifically, they see formal rules, i.e. laws and regulations enforced by the strong
bureaucratic state, as necessary for the otherwise imperfect markets to perform (Khanna
& Palepu, 1997; North, 1990; Peng, 2003; Wan, 2005). Absence, or weakness of a
bureaucratic state, is thus seen as an institutional deficiency, or as it is widely known in
the literature, institutional voids (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Firms are believed to build
political connections in order to fill, or substitute (Roth & Kostova, 2003) these voids.
This view assumes that formal rules need to be set up and created by states so that
markets can function properly and enhance economic performance. This understanding,
similar to the dominant perspective in the corruption literature, reflects a combination of
market logic and state logic.
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Overall, most of the literature on political connectedness considers all sorts of
informal exchanges between firms and governments as a consequence of institutional
underdevelopment, and – either implicitly or explicitly – labels them all as inefficient
forms of business-government interaction. Yet, political connectedness could just be one
of many ways that enable strategic interaction between firms and governments. From an
institutional logics perspective, different blends of logics across countries make different
strategies of interacting with the government available to firms. Thus, the different forms
of firm-government interaction we see between developed countries and emerging
countries are primarily caused by different blending of institutional logics. In developed
countries, market and state logics – i.e. impersonal logics – take precedence over family
and community logics – i.e. relational logics –, which makes firm-government interaction
subject to formal control mechanisms such as laws and regulations (North, 1990; Peng,
2003). As a result, exchanges between firms and governments in these countries tend to
be impersonal and rule-based. In emerging countries, on the other hand, relational logics
prevail over impersonal logics, which makes firm-government interaction subject to
informal control mechanisms such as unconditional loyalties or reciprocal obligations. As
a result, exchanges between firms and governments in these countries tend to be
personalized and relationship-based.
Firms’ rule-based, impersonal – formal – exchanges with governments are
facilitated by political action committees, lobbying entities, as well as through interorganizational ties with other government bodies, such as a joint venture with a stateowned enterprise (Sun, Mellahi, & Thun, 2010). On the other hand, personalized,
relationship-based – informal – exchanges with governments are facilitated by variety of
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political ties, such as those 1) between corporate executives and politicians or
government officials, e.g. friendships and kinships; 2) between politicians and firms, e.g.
politicians sitting on corporate boards; and 3) between corporate executives and political
institutions, e.g. executives appointed as politicians (Faccio, 2006). Table 2.3 contrasts
the two types of firm-government interaction.

2.4 Varieties of Firm Government Interactions
The domination of an institutional system by a combination of market logic and
state logic is a mixture of the ideal economic systems of the two logics, i.e. market
capitalism and welfare capitalism. The consequent economic system is one in which
neither can market dominate for economic gain nor can state for social gain. This is in
fact the case in all developed countries2, in which the government provides with the legal
and regulatory framework that regulates and coordinates market exchange with the aim of
increasing social well-being, but also in which there is always some market exchange that
exists beyond the state's reach. I call this blend of market and state logics bureaucratic
logic.
Emerging countries, on the other hand, have other logics than those of the state
and of the market that shape their economic systems. Weak state logic in these countries
mean that rule of law is not strong. The implication is that although the states in these
countries may attempt to regulate and coordinate economic activity, they are not
subordinate to rational and legal standards when doing it. They also lack the capacity and
legitimacy to exert control over economy. Furthermore, weak market logic means that
exchanges are not always based on rational utility maximization. On the other hand,
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strong family logic and community logic in these countries make unconditional loyalties
and reciprocal obligations important factors that shape behavior. Drawing on the extant
literature (Budd, 2004; Fukuyama, 2011; Roth, 1968; Theobald, 1982; Uricoechea,
1980), I call this blend of institutional logics – i.e. weak market and state logics,
combined with strong family and community logics – patrimonial logic. In such a
system, patronage ties between corporate actors and political actors constitute a common
practice. Considering this, the existence of patrimonial logic as opposed to bureaucratic
logic is probably the most important element that distinguishes emerging countries from
developed countries.
The German sociologist Max Weber (1968) originally coined the term
patrimonialism. According to him, patrimonialism meant that the governmental offices
originate in the household administration of the patriarchal ruler. Patrimonialism, in this
sense, is a result of the extension of patriarchal rule to the military, economic, and
political functions of the state. In other words, patrimonialism occurs when the personage
representing the ruling family is amalgamated with the state. This diffusion of patriarchal
rule to bureaucracy corresponds to the blend between family logic and state logic in this
paper. Scholars who built on Weber subsequently added community logic to this blend.
For example, Fukuyama (2011) argues that patronage ties are based on the two principles
of kin selection and reciprocal altruism. In this case, the former clearly corresponds to
family logic, while the latter certainly amounts to community logic.
It is important to note that this paper diverges from the extant patrimonialism
literature in its view of institutions. According to the latter, institutions differ across
countries in degree, not in kind (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Thus, the patrimonialism
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literature sees patronage ties as a consequence of weak or absent impersonal institutions.
In this regard, Weber identified patrimonialism as one of the three forms of traditional
domination, the other two being charismatic leadership and feudalism. Although scholars
like Fukuyama extended and contributed to Weber’s original conceptualization of
patrimonialism, the view of patronage ties as an inferior, archaic, exotic, and an
ineffective form of governance has remained consistent in the literature. For example,
Roth (1968) describes several features of patrimonialism including the survival of a
traditional regime, “where the researcher, if he gains access at all, can almost perform the
feat of travelling into the past” (p. 195-196). Uricoechea (1980), in his analysis of
patrimonial foundations of the Brazilian Bureaucratic State, equates patrimonialism with
the militarization of the Brazilian society and the consequent human rights abuses:
“Monstrosity may be defined as a mode of being, the essential changes of which are
contingent and accidental. If we accept this definition, we can readily apply it to
patrimonial bureaucracy" (p. 43). Similar to this, Budd (2004) argues that patrimonialism
hinders democracy and economic growth in emerging countries. Finally, Fukuyama
(2011) sees patrimonialism as a source of political decay, and an impediment to state
building.
As explained earlier, however, an important tenet of this paper is that institutions
are not universal (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Tsui, 2007; Whetten, 2009). Impersonal
institutions, i.e. bureaucratic logic that shapes firm-government interaction in the West
are not necessarily the norm. Neither is the patrimonial logic that shapes firmgovernment interaction in emerging countries should be seen as “voids”, or “deviations”
from the ideal-typical situation. Thus, the main argument of this paper is logic blending
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gives rise not just to differences of degree, but the fundamental differences in kind
(Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Overall, different forms of firm-government relations across
countries are determined by different interplays among institutional logics that create a
systemic logic that makes a certain form of firm-government interaction prevalent. In this
sense, formal exchanges between firms and governments should be more common in
countries where market logic and state logic are strong enough to confine family logic
and community logic to their domains. On the other hand, informal exchanges between
firms and governments should be more common in countries where logic of the family
and community are strong enough to suppress the logics of the market and the state.
Figure 2.2 shows countries according to the interplay among institutional logics.

2.5 Discussion
In developed countries, where bureaucratic logic dominates, the boundary that
separates legitimate exchanges between firms and governments from the illegitimate ones
is determined primarily determined by one principle: the exchange should be based on
impersonal rules. Under bureaucratic logic, there is a strict separation between public and
private, and hence government officials avoid personalized exchanges, as well as using
their power for personal gain. Therefore, in developed countries, a legitimate firmgovernment interaction is mainly in the form of lobbying or campaign contributions. In
emerging countries, however, where family and community logics dominate, exchanges
between firms and governments are often personalized. Thus, it is legitimate for
government officials in those countries to fulfill their familial or reciprocal obligations by
using public power to favor relatives and “clients”, as well as friends. In this sense, it is
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normal and rational for exchanges between firms and governments to be facilitated by
horizontal and vertical networks between corporate and political actors. This, however, is
deemed as corruption in developed countries, as family and community logics are weak,
while state logic is strong. This addresses the research questions of this paper by
explaining 1) how the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate exchanges between
firms and governments are drawn, and 2) how this boundary differs across countries.
There have been very few attempts to define what corruption and political
connectedness are, and how they differ from each other. In this respect, one definition,
“abuse of public power for personal gain”, has been taken for granted, and deeply
influenced the scholarly approach to the issue. This definition, however, embodies
bureaucratic logic, which shapes the way firms and governments interact with each other
in the West. In emerging countries, on the other hand, patrimonial logic provides
different strategies of action, and hence leads to different forms of exchanges between
firms and governments. In this regard, most studies on emerging countries have ended up
imposing Western bureaucratic logic on non-Western phenomena (Tsui, 2007), and
erroneously labeled all kinds of informal ties between firms and governments as
corruption. Drawing from the institutional logics perspective, this study offers a fresh
lens to study firm-government interaction in emerging country contexts, where, not only
the logics of the market and the state, but also those of the family and the community
together shape the boundary that separates legitimate and illegitimate exchanges between
firms and governments.
This essay also contributes to the institutional logics literature by demonstrating
that how dissimilar logics blend. In this regard, some of the extant literature has typically
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focused on a single dominant logic that shapes the entire institutional system. For
example, Lounsbury (2002) documented that during the 1980s, the regulatory logic that
emphasized bank lending in the US financial sector yielded to a market logic, which gave
rise to retail-oriented financial services competition. Similarly, Lounsbury (2007)
demonstrated that the mutual fund industry in Boston is dominated by trustee logic,
which represents a traditional, long-term oriented, and craft-based approach to money
management. He found that the mutual fund industry in New York, on the other hand, is
dominated by a performance logic, which represents a modern, short-term oriented,
professional approach to money management. Although some other studies in the logics
literature have acknowledged the co-existence of competing logics, these scholars have
assumed that such different logics separately guide different actors. For example, Reay
and Hinnings (2009) argued that physicians in the Canadian health care industry adhered
to professional logic, whereas the government supported business logic. Marquis and
Lounsbury (2007) argued that two logics in the US banking industry compete to
dominate the organizational field: national logic manifested through national banks, and
community logic reflected through community banks. Similarly, Greenwood et al. (2010)
found that the downsizing decisions of large firms concentrated in regions whose
governments champion regional distinctiveness are influenced by regional logic, whereas
those of smaller firms are shaped by family logic. Luo (2007) identified two logics that
determine training attitudes across countries: statism, which emphasizes state authority
over civil society, and corporatism, which emphasizes a guild-based system with
collective bargaining and apprenticeship over a market system with hire-and-fire
practices. She found that countries with strong statist and corporate logics are more likely
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to prefer continuous learning model of training. Although some exceptional studies have
tried to explain how different how logics blend, such attempts have remained scarce. For
example, Glynn & Lounsbury (2005) studied how the aesthetic logic that traditionally
informs the practices of the symphony and the commercially oriented market logic
blended with each other in the context of Atlanta Symphony Orchestra. This paper
follows the footsteps of Glynn and Lounsbury by explaining logic blending in the
international context of firm-government interaction.
2.5.1 Implications for International Business
The premise of the institutional logics perspective that institutions are
simultaneously material and symbolic makes it distinct from neo-institutional
frameworks used in international business (Busenitz, Gomez, & Spencer, 2000; Kostova
& Roth, 2002). In this regard, institutional logics are more than regulative, normative,
and cognitive structures that impose predictable patterns of behavior through legal and
social sanctions, or cultural indoctrination. Logics shape behavior not due to the coercive,
normative, and mimetic pressures they exert, but because logics define actors’ interests
and enable them to pursue their objectives in a certain way. In this sense, institutions are
providers of resources and capabilities that allow its constituents to undertake some
activities more successfully than others (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). The implication of this
for firm-government interaction is that political connectedness occurs in emerging
countries not because it is highly valued by people or imposed by law, but because it is a
capability which firms employ when they interact with the government.
The notion of duality also distinguishes institutional logics approach from the new
institutional economics in international business, which is based on the premise that
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formal institutions determine firms’ strategic choices by providing the incentive
structures (Peng, 2003; Wan, 2005). According to the school of new institutional
economics in international business, corruption and political ties occur in emerging
countries considerably more than developed countries, because the benefits they provide
exceed their costs in contexts where weaker formal institutions is associated with lower
costs of engaging in such practices (Kim, Kim, & Hoskisson, 2010; Peng & Luo, 2000).
From an institutional logics perspective, this explanation overlooks the role of informal
norms and meanings associated with strategic action. This is not to say that institutional
logics perspective does not recognize the importance of formal institutions in explaining
behavior. In fact, it suggests that symbolic constructions do not make sense if the material
world is not appropriately constructed. Transition economies epitomize such a situation.
For example, the notion of an arm’s length transaction does not hold in Eastern Europe,
where formal institutions that enforce contracts remain weak (Buchan, 2009). However,
institutional logics approach also suggests that deployment of material resources alone
cannot organize people’s lives if they do not find correspondence in society’s shared
beliefs and understandings. For example, exchanges in Japan are still facilitated by
relational networks rather than contract laws, despite the strong rule of law in this
country. This is because strong formal institutions associated with contract enforcement
cannot make rule-based, impersonal contracting a common practice in Japan if Japanese
people’s propensity to trust others remains low (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). New
institutional economics approach in international business, in this regard, mostly focuses
on “the observable”, and neglects “the unobservable”, e.g. subtle meanings that underlie
formal structures and common practices.
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Institutional logics approach has also implications for the broader economic
perspective in international business, which solely emphasizes the role of incentive
structures as the primary cause of corruption and political connectedness. Regardless of
the differences in the antecedents of the incentives – either formal institutions or pure
market forces –, all economic perspectives converge on the assumption that actors engage
in corruption and political connections mainly because they have interest in doing so.
However, institutional logics approach suggests that there are no objective incentives that
can be understood independently of actors’ understandings. Institutional logics shape
both the ends to which their behavior should be directed, and the means by which those
ends are achieved (Friedland & Alford, 1991). In this sense, logics shape the rules by
which utility is defined and pursued. As a result, incentives are not universal, but rather
contingent on institutions.

2.6 Conclusion
This perspective paper addressed two research questions: 1) What draws the
boundary that separates legitimate and illegitimate exchanges between firms and
governments?, and 2) how does this boundary differ across countries? The essay drew on
the institutional logics perspective to answer the questions. In this regard, I argued that
people use logics to distinguish a legitimate form of firm-government interaction from an
illegitimate one. Specifically, I proposed that informal, personal exchanges between firms
and governments, i.e. political connectedness, is illegitimate under market logic and state
logic, whereas it is legitimate under family and community logic. In order to answer the
second research question, I explained the differences between developed countries and
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emerging countries in the way that firms and governments interact with each other. In
this respect, I argued that political connectedness in emerging countries arises from the
interplay among four institutional orders: the market, the state, the family, and the
community, which together generate a patrimonial logic. In developed countries, on the
other hand, state logic and market logic come together to generate bureaucratic logic,
which pervades the institutional systems of these countries, and insulates the logics of the
family and the community from the domain of firm-government relations. This results in
the prevalence of formal, impersonal exchanges between firms and governments in
developed countries.

NOTES

1

i.e. voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government

effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption.
2

In fact, no country’s system in the world is either purely state or purely market driven.
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Table 2.1: Institutional orders that shape firm-government interaction, adapted from Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury (2012)
State

Family

Community

Basis of strategy

Self-interest

Social well-being

Family reputation &
honor

Community status

Strategy

Commodification of
human activity

Control
mechanisms

Rational, impersonal,
universal

Rationalization and
regulation of human
activity
Formal, rational,
impersonal, universal

Source of authority

Possession of ownership

Bureaucratic hierarchies

Motivation of human
activity for unconditional
obligations
Informal,
non-rational, personal,
particularistic
Patriarchal domination

Source of legitimacy Economic performance,
share price

Democratic participation

Unconditional loyalty

Motivation of human
activity for reciprocal
obligations
Informal,
non-rational, personal,
particularistic
Commitment to
community values &
ideology
Unity of will, trust &
reciprocity
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Market

Source of identity

Faceless

Citizenship in nation

Family membership

Community membership

Economic system

Market capitalism

Welfare capitalism

Family capitalism

Cooperative capitalism

Table 2.2: Institutional logics and corresponding remedies for corruption
Market logic
(Economic
remedies)
Corresponding -Mass privatization
-Market liberalization
solutions to
-Trade liberalization
remedy
-Macro-stabilization
corruption
-Economic
development
-Competitive wages
for government
officials
-Nothing (Corruption
allows supply and
demand to operate)

State logic
(Legal remedies)

Blend of market
logic and state logic

-Punitive laws
-Strict regulations
-Protection of
property and
contractual rights
-Bureaucratic
monitoring
mechanisms

-Different
combinations of
economic and legal
remedies
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Table 2.3: Varieties of firm-government interactions, adapted from Faccio (2006)
and Sun et al. (2010)
Formal exchanges
Political action committees

Informal exchanges
Personal ties between corporate
executives and politicians or
government officials (e.g. kinship,
friendship)
Personal ties between politicians and
firms (e.g. politicians sitting on
corporate boards)

Lobbying entities

Inter-organizational ties between firms
and political institutions (e.g. joint
ventures between public firms and
state owned enterprises)

Personal ties between corporate
executives and political institutions
(e.g. executives appointed as
politicians)

47

Table 2.4: Blends of logics across countries
Developed countries Emerging countries

Market logic

Strong

Weak

State logic

Strong

Weak

Family logic

Weak

Strong

Community logic

Weak

Strong

Bureaucratic logic

Patrimonial logic
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Macro
(Society)

Institutional
Logics

Structures and
Common Practices

Learning
Logics

Micro
(Organizational/
Individual)

Enacting
Logics

Sensemaking

Action

Figure 2.1: Cross-level model of institutional logics, adapted from Thornton et al.
(2012)
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Market
Logic

Developed
Countries
State
Logic

Family
Logic
Emerging
Countries

Community
Logic

Figure 2.2: Interplay among institutional logics across countries
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CHAPTER 3
MAKING SENSE OF POLITICAL CONNECTEDNESS: CORRUPTION
OR STRATEGY?

3.1. Motivation


JPMorgan Chase hired the son of a former Chinese banking regulator who is
now the chairman of the China Everbright Group, a state-controlled financial
conglomerate. After the chairman’s son came on board, JPMorgan secured
multiple coveted assignments from the Chinese conglomerate, including
advising a subsidiary of the company on a stock offering.



The Hong Kong office of JPMorgan hired the daughter of a Chinese
railway official when The China Railway Group, a state-controlled
construction company that builds railways for the Chinese government, was
in the process of selecting JPMorgan to advise on its plans to become a
public company. With JPMorgan’s help, China Railway raised more than
$5 billion when it went public in 2007. (New York Times, 2013)

Such hiring practices by JP Morgan in China epitomize the role of political
connectedness in emerging countries. In this regard, the incentive for corporations to
become politically connected has been recognized among scholars. The source of such
value is not limited to preferential treatment by state-owned enterprises or the
government, but also includes lighter taxation, relaxed regulatory oversight, or stiffer
regulatory oversight of its rivals (Faccio, 2006). Given its importance, some international
business scholars conceptualize political connectedness as a non-market capability that
yields competitive advantage in emerging countries, where such practices are prevalent
(Kim, Kim, & Hoskisson, 2010; Peng, 2003; Wan, 2005). These scholars view political
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connectedness in emerging markets in economic and relational terms, and therefore frame
them as an opportunity for firms.
Yet, forming direct or indirect ties to foreign government officials poses
challenges to multinational enterprises from developed countries. Because such
practices violate the legal and social norms in their home countries, developed country
firms are likely to face legal and social sanctions if they engage in political
connectedness abroad (Rodriguez et al., 2005; Spencer & Gomez, 2011). Thus,
political connectedness may hurt a developed country firm’s legitimacy not only in
their home countries, but all around the world (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). For
instance, the Securities and Exchange Commission opened an anti-bribery into JP
Morgan’s hiring practices in China. Further, this investigation, along with the hiring
practices themselves, is extensively reported by the global media, which negatively
affects the JP Morgan’s international reputation. In this respect, the international
business literature on corruption conceptualizes political connectedness in social
terms, and frames them as a threat to firms.
These two perspectives show that political connectedness creates a dilemma
for multinationals. On one hand, political connectedness seems to be an important
source of competitive advantage in many emerging countries. On the other hand, if
uncovered, it may hurt a firm’s legitimacy. In this sense, managers of multinationals
need to take into account both strategic imperatives and legitimacy concerns when
managing their firm’s political ties. However, the academic literature has yet to
combine these two perspectives in developing a holistic analysis of these issues. For
instance, the corruption literature usually explores the case of a direct bribe between
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economic and political actors (Bardhan, 1997; Kaufmann, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999;
Schleifer & Vishny, 1993), without exploring the types of long-term inter-personal
relationships such as those that JP Morgan sought to build in China.
This essay bridges this gap in the literature by looking at both economic and
social aspects of political connectedness. Specifically, I look at the decision making
processes by which local and expatriate managers in emerging countries come to
define the boundaries between political connectedness and corruption. Thus, instead
of trying to define an objective measure of when political connectedness turns into
corruption, I aim to understand the way that decision makers themselves subjectively
perceive, interpret, and respond to political connectedness in emerging countries:
Research Question 1: How do expatriate managers in emerging countries make
sense of political connectedness?
Research Question 2: How does the way expatriate managers make sense of
political connectedness affect firm strategy?

The conceptual framework that I develop to answer these questions, i.e.
institutional sensemaking, explains the cognitive underpinnings of responses to political
connectedness, thereby contributing to the institutional logics literature, which does not
directly examine the cognitive mechanisms that link institutions with firm strategy.
Moreover, the framework explains the institutional antecedents of sensemaking, thereby
contributing to the managerial sensemaking literature, which does not take into account
the impact of the wider social structures and beliefs on the cognitive processes occurring
at the managerial-level.
This essay also has important practical implications because it will help managers
be aware of distinction between their own preexisting knowledge systems, i.e. the
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bureaucratic logic prevailing in their home countries, and the patrimonial logic prevailing
in emerging countries. Consequently, managers can avoid biases both toward and against
emerging countries, and better understand business phenomena in these countries. This
will enable managers to develop appropriate strategic responses to the challenges they
face in emerging countries, which will not only contribute to the economic performance
of the multinationals they run, but also to that of the emerging countries in which they
operate.

3.2 Literature Review
As explained earlier, there are two separate streams of research in international
business related to political connectedness. On one hand, there is a literature that labels
political connectedness as corruption or bribery (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Meschi, 2009;
Spencer & Gomez, 2011; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). This research stream reflects a social
perspective, and hence focuses on the legal and moral aspects of political connectedness.
For example, Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) demonstrates that firms from countries with laws
against bribery abroad are less likely to enter countries with high levels of corruption.
Spencer & Gomez (2011) find that multinationals from countries with lower-levels of
corruption engage in less bribery abroad. Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) show that
multinationals are more likely to enter into joint ventures with local firms when they
enter emerging markets with higher levels of corruption. Meschi (2009) documents that
the more corrupt the host country is, the less likely multinationals are to terminate joint
ventures with local firms. As these empirical findings show, this literature suggests that
firms make sense of political connectedness as corruption and therefore try to avoid it.
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On the other hand, there is a separate literature on political connectedness, which
reflects an economic perspective. This literature thus focuses on the economic and
relational aspects of political connectedness. Scholars in this literature use labels such as
“political capital” (Yiu & Lau, 2008), “political embeddedness” (Sun et al., 2010), and
“political networks” (Peng, 2003), to refer to the political connectedness phenomenon.
Moreover, the empirical findings in this literature suggest that political connectedness is a
source of competitive advantage in emerging markets. For example, Peng and Luo (2000)
find political connectedness to be positively associated with firm performance in China,
whereas Faccio (2006) shows that political connectedness increases firm value around the
world. Similarly, Yiu & Lau (2008) demonstrate that political connectedness positively
affects product and organizational innovation, as well as domestic and international
venturing. Finally, Claessens et al. (2008) document that political connectedness
increases stock returns in Brazil. Overall, this literature suggests that firms make sense of
political connectedness as a source of competitive advantage, and therefore try to
increase political connectedness.
As this review demonstrates, the international business literature concerning
political connectedness portrays a black and white picture of political connectedness:
Firms either make sense of political connectedness as corruption and avoid it, or make
sense of political connectedness as strategy and they do it. In other words, the
international business literature does not offer a complete picture of political
connectedness, thereby failing to address the conflicting pressures that multinationals like
JP Morgan face when they operate in countries such as China. This is because firm
strategy, in the field of international business, has been generally explained based on
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either techno-economic or institutional factors. In this regard, the techno-economic
factors are emphasized by the economic perspective, which views firm strategy as a
rational, interest-seeking response to incentives, whereas the institutional factors are
stressed by the social perspective, which regards firm strategy as an irrational,
endorsement-seeking response to legitimacy pressures. Despite the apparent contrasts
between these two views, both presume that actors narrowly pursuit mechanical quests.
Both consider firm strategy to be a function of exogenous, objective pressures, detached
from firm’s decision makers, who are actually the ones that formulate strategic responses
(Dacin et al., 2002; George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006; Hambrick &
Mason, 1984; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; Nadkarni & Barr; 2008). According to those two
views, firms are swept along by economic and institutional pressures, or in other words,
run by them, not by people. Organizational decision makers, in this sense, are considered
as nothing but faceless abstractions (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995). Thus, very little is known
about how actors’ sensemaking of the strategic issues affect their responses to them. In
order to address these shortcomings in the international business literature, I draw on the
managerial sensemaking literature (Daft & Weick, 1984; Kiesler & Sproull, 1982).

3.3 Theoretical Background

3.3.1 Managerial Sensemaking
The sensemaking literature suggests that organizational responses to
environmental events are shaped by a sequential, tripartite cognitive process, consisting
of attention, interpretation, and action (Daft & Weick, 1984; Kiesler & Sproull, 1982).
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The first stage of the sensemaking process is attention, through which actors recognize
and gather raw information about a new issue, or miss and ignore it altogether. Attention,
in this sense, represents one’s field of vision: information that falls outside this field goes
unnoticed (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Once an issue penetrates the filters (field of
vision), however, the raw information is given meaning. This constitutes the
interpretation stage, at which issues are framed or labeled. Then issues are categorized
based on the labels attached to them (Dutton & Jackson, 1987). In this regard, two of the
most salient labels or frames that are used for categorization are “threat” and
“opportunity” (Dutton & Duncan, 1987; George et al., 2006; Thomas, Clark, & Gioia,
1993). Finally, action is the process in which those frames are acted upon and causeeffect relationships are put into practice (Daft & Weick, 1984). Decision makers who
frame an issue differently generate a different set of action responses. For example, the
sensemaking literature suggests that threat framing causes rigidity in decision making
that restricts strategic repertoire, whereas opportunity framing promotes risk-taking that
enhances it (George et al., 2006; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981; Thomas et al.,
1993).
Although the sensemaking literature has articulated the cognitive mechanisms that
mediate responses to environmental issues and events (Daft & Weick, 1984; Hambrick &
Mason, 1984; Nadkarni & Perez, 2007; Nadkarni et al., 2011), it has overlooked the
impact of institutions on these cognitive mechanisms. In this sense, the sensemaking
literature has typically adopted a decontextualized view of sensemaking, assuming that
the tripartite cognitive process occurs independently of the environment (Barr, Stimpert,
& Huff, 1992; Caproni et al., 1992; Chattopadhyay, Glick, & Huber, 2001; Daft,
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Sormunen, & Parks, 1988; Garg, Walters, & Priem, 2003; Jackson & Dutton, 1988;
Plambeck & Weber, 2009; Roth, 1995; Thomas et al., 1993) - although some exceptional
studies have looked at the role of the industry or the cultural environment in shaping
sensemaking (Barr & Glynn, 2004; Calori et al., 1994; Elenkov, 1997; May, Stewart, &
Sweo, 2000; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008) -. As a result, the sensemaking literature has paid
little attention to how organizational and managerial cognition is influenced by wider
societal beliefs and structures (i.e. institutions at the macro level), and hence has
overlooked the role of institutions as being the antecedent of individual and managerial
cognition. In order to address this shortcoming of the managerial sensemaking literature,
I draw on the institutional logics perspective (Thornton et al., 2012).

3.3.2 Institutional Sensemaking
Despite its contributions to our understanding of how institutions at the macrolevel affect strategic action at the organizational and individual level, the institutional
logics perspective has not elaborated on the cognitive mechanisms through which actors
perceive, interpret, and act upon institutional prescriptions. Empirical studies drawing on
the institutional logics perspective have only inferred such cognitive mechanisms, rather
than directly examining them.
I address this void in the institutional logics literature by integrating the microlevel model of tripartite sensemaking with the cross-level model of institutional logics to
develop a new conceptual framework, which I call institutional sensemaking. This
framework explains 1) how institutional logics that firms and their decision makers learn
and incorporate shape the way they make sense of the structures and common practices
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that they face in emerging countries, and 2) how their sensemaking shapes their responses
to those structures and common practices.
According to this framework, institutional logics enter the tripartite sensemaking
process at the individual and organizational level as preexisting knowledge systems
(Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), and affect all three stages. First, institutional logics shape
attention (the type and amount of information actors gather about issues) by providing a
set of implicit rules that regulate which issues, strategic contingencies, or problems
become important. The meaning of an issue is not inherent in this raw information,
however. Information is subsequently interpreted and infused with meanings (Dutton &
Jackson, 1987). Therefore, it is neither the issue itself, nor the information gathered about
the issue, but the interpreted information (the meanings attached to the issue), that shapes
how the issues is acted upon. In this sense, Bettis and Prahalad (1995) distinguish raw
information from appropriate actionable knowledge: A flood of information has no value
if actors cannot appropriately interpret and act upon it. In this regard, logics provide
frames such as threat and opportunity through which meaning is imposed on the
information gathered about a strategic issue (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009). Third, logics affect
action by providing range and type of behavior alternatives that can be conceived of, and
that are considered appropriate (Thornton, 2004). When logics are socially shared and
acted upon by the majority of society, the material aspects of institutions, i.e. structures
and common practices come about. Institutional logics thus constitute the
symbolic/cognitive foundation of the structures and common practices in a society.
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3.4 Deconstructing the international business literature on political connectedness
by using the institutional sensemaking framework
A careful reading of the international business literature related to political
connectedness through the lens of institutional sensemaking reveals that the two separate
research streams discussed earlier actually embody opposing logics. On one hand, the
literature on corruption embodies bureaucratic logic. Under this logic, managerial
attention will be directed to the legal and moral aspects of political connectedness.
Therefore, managers will frame political connectedness as a threat, and hence will seek to
avoid political connectedness. On the other hand, the literature on political connectedness
embodies patrimonial logic. Under this logic, managerial attention will be directed to the
economic and relational aspects of political connectedness. Therefore, managers will
frame political connectedness as an opportunity, and hence will seek to increase political
connectedness. In short, the deconstruction of these two literatures show how the two
dissimilar logics differently shape the way managers make sense of and respond to
political connectedness, as shown in Table 3.1. This theorization is also illustrated by the
model of institutional sensemaking of political connectedness in Table 3.2 and Figure
3.3.
As the model of institutional sensemaking of political connectedness is based on
the deconstruction the extant literature, however, it is limited by it. In other words, the
model still portrays a black and white picture of political connectedness: managers make
sense of political connectedness either as a threat and avoid it, or as an opportunity and
do it. Such an either or neither nor sensemaking and response arising from two dissimilar
logics fails to offer a complete explanation of political connectedness.
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Sensemaking scholars, however, have highlighted the importance of cognitive
complexity for addressing multiple conflicting pressures (Caproni et al., 1992; Calori et
al., 1994; Nadkarni & Perez, 2007). Cognitive complexity is defined as the degree of
differentiation and integration within a cognitive structure (Bartunek , Gordon, &
Weathersby, 1983). In other words, it reflects the breadth and depth of the knowledge
embedded in it (Calori et al., 1994). Differentiation represents the ability to perceive
several dimensions in a stimulus array, whereas integration corresponds to the
development of complex connections among the differentiated characteristics. In this
regard, managers high in integration and low in differentiation are able to make use of the
concepts in their cognitive structures simultaneously to make sense of a stimulus,
however, they will find it hard to adopt multiple perspectives to that stimulus, as the
number of concepts they can accommodate is limited. The implication is that managers
high in integration but low in differentiation lack the variability and flexibility to learn
dissimilar logics. On the other hand, managers high in differentiation and low in
integration can hold several perspectives simultaneously, but fail to combine them to
have a better understanding of the stimulus. Although such managers have the ability to
adopt multiple perspectives, they lack the cognitive capabilities to link these perspectives
with each other. The implication is that managers high in differentiation but low in
integration lack the coherence to blend dissimilar logics.
The extant literature on cognitive complexity, however, shows that managers with
cognitive complexity are high in both dimensions, possessing the cognitive capability to
simultaneously hold and apply several competing and complementary interpretations of
situations and events (Bartunek et al., 1983). Since these decision-makers can both

61

accommodate more concepts in their cognitive structures and link these concepts with
each other, they can understand issues from multiple perspectives, and can
simultaneously synthesize these perspectives to form a holistic view. The implication is
that managers with cognitive complexity can learn dissimilar logics and blend these
logics with each other.
In order to further our understanding of the interplay among institutional
sensemaking, cognitive complexity, and political connectedness, a field research was
conducted in China. The methodology used in this field research and the insights gained
into the political connectedness phenomenon in China are explained below.

3.5 Methodology

3.5.1 Sample
As part of the field research, I interviewed fourteen expatriate managers in China.
The interviews took place between August and October 2015. Of the fourteen expatriate
managers, two were American, two were Canadian, two were Australian, one was
British, one was German, one was Singaporean, and one was Japanese. Thus, all the
expatriate managers were from countries where bureaucratic logic is prevalent
(Fukuyama, 1995; Fukuyama, 2001; Fukuyama, 2011). Five expatriates were mid-level
managers, whereas the rest of them either owned businesses in China or were the country
managers of some American and Canadian multinationals. Three expatriate managers
were based in Beijing, while all the others were based in Shanghai. The firms which
expatriate managers worked for operated in a variety of industries, ranging from medical
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device wholesale trade and consulting to logistics and commercial photography, thereby
reducing the risk that my findings may be specific to certain industries or sectors.
I obtained access to the expatriate managers mostly by attending the American
Chamber of Commerce events in Shanghai. Only the Australian and Singaporean
participants, as well as one American participant, were accessed through existing
personal connections. As is typical of this type of qualitative research, the resultant
sample is neither totally random, nor is complete (McCracken, 1988; Witt & Redding,
2009).

3.5.2 Interviews
I obtained data from my sample of managers through in depth, semi-structured
interviews, in which I used a scenario as a stimulus material to prompt participants to talk
about such a sensitive topic as political connectedness. This is a common method used in
ethnographic research (McCracken, 1988). Although the scenario was fictional, it was
based on JP Morgan’s hiring practices in China. The scenario is as follows:
“Bob, the executive of the ABC company, hires a young college graduate
named Xiaoqiang, who is qualified for the position. However, Bob
chooses Xiaoqiang over more qualified candidates because Xiaoqiang's
father is a senior government official. Some time after the hiring,
Xiaoqiang's father takes charge of a government contract, in which the
ABC company is one of the bidders. Xiaoqiang's father awards the
contract to the ABC company, despite receiving more competitive bids
from the ABC's rivals.”
I gave this scenario to the participants and asked them to evaluate the practices
described in it. This method allowed the participants to distance themselves from the
characters and their behavior stated in the scenario. Thus, although the participants did
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not have to share their personal experiences with me, they revealed their personal
opinions about political connectedness when they evaluated the scenario.

3.5.3 Data
The interviews were all audio-recorded and transcribed. All the interviews were
conducted in English and were transcribed by myself. It was these transcribed interview
texts that comprised the data for eliciting managerial sensemaking.
In order to measure managerial sensemaking, I content analyzed the transcribed
interview texts by using NVivo software. The content analysis involved coding the
phrases and sentences that manifest attention focus and framing of political
connectedness based on the model of institutional sensemaking of political
connectedness. Thus, texts that manifest an attention focus on the legal and moral aspects
of political connectedness were coded under a separate node from those that reflect an
attention focus on the economic and relational aspects. Similarly, texts that manifest a
threat framing of political connectedness were coded under a separate node from those
that reflect an opportunity framing. Table 3.4 shows the sample sentences used for
coding.

3.6 Content Analysis
Attention focus on legal and moral aspects of political connectedness were not
coded independently, because the participants most of the time did not separate the two in
the interviews. Legal remarks were usually followed by moral remarks, and vice versa. In
this sense, legal and moral dimensions were intertwined: What is legally wrong was also
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considered to be also morally wrong by the participants, which led to the negative
framing of political connectedness. This in turn generated the intention to avoid political
connectedness.
“I am the legal rep of my company. If anything goes wrong in my
company they can throw me in the jail or send me back to Canada. So if
you are the legal rep, the legal rep is responsible for whatever the people
do. The expat that was a legal rep for …, a big mining company, he is now
in prison here. Two years ago he was convicted for paying bribes and he is
Australian, but originally from China, Chinese-Australian, he is now
prison. He was the legal rep. The more they prosecute I think it will help
but it still goes on because everybody says I am not going to get caught.”
(Expatriate manager G)
As can be seen in this excerpt of the interview, the Canadian manager directs his
attention to the legal dimension. He particularly emphasizes the role of punitive laws in
anti-corruption efforts by showing some potential legal consequences for receiving
bribes. At this point, he clearly labels political connectedness as bribery, and hence
frames it in negative terms. This was a common pattern among the expatriate
participants: Attention to the legal aspects leads the managers to label political
connectedness as corruption, and to frame it as a threat. As a result, they intend to avoid
political connectedness. Here is another example:
“You cannot really promise something or offer something or receive
anything that shows you get a financial benefit other than just the contract
that you have. We cannot do anything like that. And if we were in a
partnership with a firm here, and they did it, that is ground for breaking
the contract. We cannot do that. We just cannot afford to do that. They are
very strict here in China about corruption. They put people in jail here.”
(Expatriate manager F)
Attention to the moral dimension similarly leads the participants to refer to
political connectedness as corruption or bribery and to frame it in negative terms. As
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another Canadian manager based in Shanghai puts it, hiring employees based on their
political connections is morally wrong and hence should be avoided:
“This is unethical [hiring Xiaoqiang], especially for a multinational
company. Because we should hire people not based on their relationships
or family backgrounds, but we should hire people based on their
competence, or on their knowledge of the product.” (Expatriate manager
H)
As can be seen, attention focus on the principle that people should be hired based
on their qualifications leads to the perception that political connectedness is immoral. In
fact, the same country manager equates hiring politically connected employees to giving
bribes, which he says is very common in the healthcare industry, where his company
operates. In this regard, he frames political connectedness as a threat not only to his
company, but also to social welfare. This leads to the conclusion that political
connectedness is something that should not only be avoided, but also be fought against:
“…we should do the right thing in this country, and provide a very good
service to the patient. Because if corruption happens, the patient will get a
very expensive product, which is not worth it. Because some part of the
price or profit will go to some people’s pockets, which is not good. So if
everything is clean, transparent, then the patient can enjoy the lowest
price, and the doctor will also not have any trouble using your product.
The companies will also be happy because they can provide the best
service directly to the patient without having to pay money to doctors,
which is illegal. So companies will also be happy. Everyone will be
happy. The government will be happy, so why don’t we do that? We
should clean this market. We should do the right thing so that the patient
can enjoy a very good product and they can have a better life in China.”
(Expatriate manager H)
Economic and relational aspects of political connectedness, similar to the legal
and moral aspects, were often not seen as independent from each other by the
participants. Participants suggested either that political connectedness brings benefits
only when a personal relationship is involved, or that when there is a personal
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relationship with a government official then there will be benefits. Because economic and
relational aspects were intertwined, just like legal and moral aspects, they were not coded
separately.
“…you see very clearly that Chinese companies or multinationals that
develop stronger kind of personal relationships with government officials
are often going to win projects at a much higher rate than other companies.
In my previous job, I would sometimes submit bids for various projects,
and regardless of how qualified our bid was, we never won because we
often did not have the right government connections.” (Expatriate manager
A)
This expatriate manager thus sees a positive association between networks with
government officials and business outcomes. In this respect, she focuses his attention to
the economic and relational aspects of political connectedness, which leads him to frame
political connectedness as an opportunity. As a result, she suggests companies should hire
people like Xiaoqiang if they want to operate in China. This is a clear manifestation of
patrimonial logic. Overall, the content analysis of the interviews provides support for the
model of institutional sensemaking of political connectedness.

3.7 Blending dissimilar logics of firm-government interaction
The field research suggests that patrimonial logic has a strong presence in China.
Expatriate managers consistently said in the interviews that the practice of hiring
politically connected people to win business is commonplace in China, and that most
companies have well-connected employees.
As a result, most of the expatriate managers have come to think that political
connectedness is essential in for companies to operate in China, and they do not consider
it necessarily as corruption. In other words, most of the expatriate managers have learned
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patrimonial logic: They have begun to focus their attention more on the economic and
relational aspects of political connectedness, and hence to frame it as an opportunity. In
this respect, an expatriate manager thought that it was normal for candidates’ political
connections to be considered as a factor in hiring decisions. He did not perceive it as
corruption.
“It is the same in everything. You want to go to see a concert and if you
know someone you have got cheaper tickets, everything is like that in
China. The government, every little thing. Just the way the country works.
And it is the way the country has worked for a thousand years. And once
you know, once you understand that, and you realize that nothing is black
and white and anything is possible as long as you know the right
people…” (Expatriate manager K)
Similarly, another expatriate manager acknowledges that connections in the
Chinese government design institutes may play a role when he hires Chinese salespeople
for his clients. In fact, he sometimes asks candidates about their political connections
during job interviews:
“…we have talked about relationships with [Chinese government design]
institutes and things like that. Because you need to go in present your
technology, they need to at least endorse it, like it, and say it is alright for
Chinese companies to use us. In a case like that, that could factor to our
decisions. All else being equal, somebody with a good network within the
Chinese design institutes for a certain industry might have advantages over
the other candidate that we were considering.” (Expatriate manager E)
Thus, expatriates have learned patrimonial logic while in China and have come to
see political connectedness as a necessary component of their operations in China rather
than a corrupt practice. Yet, they have not totally adopted patrimonial logic either. They
instead integrate the bureaucratic logic of their home country with the patrimonial logic
of their host country to develop a hybrid logic. In other words, expatriates have come to
find a middle ground. As an expatriate manager puts it:
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“Since we are in the middle, we try to find a balance between the two
worlds, a balance point that works for both sides…As a company that
represents American companies, and also as American we cannot give
cash gifts but we can still show respect, we can still maybe entertain them
a little bit taking them to dinner and give face, and try to appease them and
befriend them in the Chinese way, without crossing the limits that are
placed upon us because we are dealing with an American company and we
are an American company, you understand? So we have to operate in kind
of within two worlds. There is overlap, there are certain things you cannot
do as an American company, there certain things they expect as a Chinese
company, but we cannot always give it to them. But there are other things
this is good in China and it is OK for us to do that as an American
company so we are able to find that middle ground in a very Chinese way,
give them respect and convince them that this is in their best interest, and
give them face and whatever and get them to ally.” (Expatriate manager E)
Thus, unlike the black and white picture portrayed by the literature, expatriate
managers in China operate in a gray area. They avoid the black area, i.e. patrimonial
logic, in which the practices are blatantly illegal and blatantly immoral in their home
countries. In this sense, expatriate managers direct their attention to the legal and moral
aspects of political connectedness. Yet, they are not committed to be in the white area
either. This is because they at the same time want to be able to operate and perform well
in their host country, which is not possible without political connectedness. In this sense,
they also direct their attention to the economic and relational aspects of political
connectedness. This leads them to frame political connectedness in both negative and
positive terms. Thus, although they do not consider political connectedness necessarily as
corruption, they think it can turn into corruption. In other words, they draw a boundary
that separates between political connectedness and corruption, or between good political
ties and bad political ties. In this regard, it is important to know how they draw this
boundary, or the boundaries of the gray area shown in Figure 3.4.
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The content analysis of interviews suggests that two factors affect how the
expatriate managers distinguish political connectedness from corruption: 1) The intent to
build and use political ties, and 2) The way these ties are utilized. As for the former, if the
intent is to gain access, or to open doors, then political connectedness is not considered
corruption. If the intent, however, is to gain an influence to get an unfair advantage, then
political connectedness becomes illegal and immoral. As for the second factor, i.e. the
way political ties are utilized, if exchange of favors between firms and governments
occurs naturally, as part of a personal relationship, expatriate managers do not consider
political connectedness as corruption. If the exchange of favors, however, occurs as part
of a transactional relationship, then expatriate managers view political connectedness as
both illegal and immoral:
“As long as nothing was agreed to, either favors exchanged or promises of
future contracts, then no, I would not see it as any problem if hiring him.
In fact, I would see as part of his qualifications the fact that his dad IS a
government official. Because he would say good things about our
company at dinner, and that would be a good thing for us, and very
influential. I would think it was wrong though if the dad asked us to hire
his son and we agreed and we later came back to the dad, and were trying
to a get a favor returned to us. That is very common practice in China
called guanxi. And also I would think it was wrong if the dad hired us to
work on a government project, and then his son got a commission or a
kickback, or some kind of boost in salary because of that. That is also very
common in China and that would be wrong. That would be illegal in the
USA and wrong in the USA. If the son was not qualified for the job, and
we hired him anyway, again I would think that is wrong. But again, that
happens all the time in China.” (Expatriate manager B)
Similar to this, the country manager of a Canadian multinational in Shanghai
distinguishes using political connectedness to gain access from corruption or bribery.
According to him, there is nothing wrong with the former:
“It is normal to hire somebody who is very well-connected. But, why do
you want those connections? You want those connections to help you do
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some business or to get some access, but you have to do that without
giving bribes.” (Expatriate manager G)

3.8 Conclusion
In this essay, I addressed two research questions: 1) How do expatriate managers
in emerging countries make sense of political connectedness?, and 2) how does the way
expatriate managers make sense of political connectedness affect firm strategy? To
answer these questions, I combined the institutional logics and tripartite sensemaking
frameworks, and developed the model of institutional sensemaking. This model explained
how different logics differently shaped the way local and expatriate managers make sense
of political connectedness in emerging countries. More specifically, I argued that
bureaucratic logic directs managerial attention to legal and moral aspects of political
connectedness. As a result, managers frame political connectedness as a threat, and seek
to avoid political connectedness. On the other hand, patrimonial logic directs managerial
attention to economic and relational aspects of political connectedness. As a result,
managers frame political connectedness as an opportunity, and seek to increase political
connectedness.
In order to apply and further the model of institutional sensemaking of political
connectedness, I conducted field research in China and interviewed 14 expatriate
managers. The insights gained from this field research provided support for the
framework. The research also demonstrated that expatriate managers blend the
bureaucratic logic of their home country with the patrimonial logic of their host country
logic to make sense of political connectedness. Under this hybrid logic, expatriates make
sense of political connectedness as a double edged sword: They focus their attention both

71

on legal/moral and economic/relational aspects of political connectedness, and they frame
it as both opportunity and threat. As a result, they distinguish political connectedness
from corruption: They separate legitimate political ties from illegitimate political ties, and
while they try to increase the former, they seek to avoid the latter.

3.9 Discussion
This research provides unique insights into the political connectedness
phenomenon in China. As opposed to the clear distinction made by the literature between
the two dissimilar logics of firm-government interaction, the field research demonstrates
that expatriates in China can learn patrimonial logic prevalent in their host country and
blend it with the bureaucratic logic prevalent in their home country. The consequent
hybrid logic directs their attention to both legal/moral and economic/relational aspects of
political connectedness. This in turn leads to the framing of political connectedness
simultaneously as a threat and an opportunity. As a result, expatriates in China can make
more fine-grained distinctions between political connectedness and corruption, forging
political ties that help them to operate more effectively in their host country without
violating the legal and ethical norms in their home countries.
This study shows the importance of managerial sensemaking in studying
multinationals responses to institutional complexity. Kostova and Zaheer (1999), in this
regard, provided a model that explains how multinationals operating in complex
environments respond to the conflicting institutional logics they face. Although Kostova
and Zaheer primarily focused on the objective characteristics of the institutional
environment and of the organization, this study documents that organizational responses
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to institutional pressures depend on managers’ subjective interpretations. Similarly,
international business scholars have extensively studied whether multinationals from
developed countries conform to or challenge the dissimilar logics they face in emerging
countries (Bailey & Spicer, 2007; Hillman & Wan, 2005; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Peng,
2003; Spicer, McDermott, & Kogut, 2000). This study explains why there is diversity of
organizational responses to the institutions in emerging countries, as well as why the
issue at hand is more complicated than an either or, neither nor choice. By having a finergrained understanding of the differences between dissimilar logics, organizations’
decision makers can view strategic issues both as a threat and an opportunity, thereby
managing to carve out a middle ground in the face of the conflicting pressures they
encounter while they operate in emerging countries.
Sensemaking scholars are increasingly interested in the phenomenon of cognitive
complexity (Calori et al., 1994; McNamara, Luce, & Tompson, 2002; Nadkarni & Perez,
2007; Nadkarni et al., 2011; Plambeck & Weber, 2010). This study shows that cognitive
complexity explains the role of the cognitive competence of the managers in
organizational coping with different institutional environments (Calori et al., 1994;
Nadkarni & Perez, 2007; Nadkarni et al., 2011). In this regard, managers with cognitive
complexity are not only able to learn and incorporate dissimilar logics, but they are also
able to integrate these logics and blend them with each other. Studying the complexity of
the cognitive structures of the managers can thus provide fresh insights into they make
sense of and respond to political connectedness in emerging countries. In this regard,
expatriate managers with more complex cognitive structures will probably be more likely
to learn the patrimonial logic in their host country, and integrate it with the bureaucratic
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logic they learned in their home country. Therefore, cognitive complexity will enable
managers to have a better understanding of political connectedness, and will provide with
them more strategic alternatives than an either or choice between avoiding and engaging
in political connectedness. Future research should focus on the relationship between
cognitive complexity/simplicity and responses to dissimilar logics in emerging countries.

3.9.1 Contributions to institutional research in international business
“Ten years ago when GE senior managers discussed the global marketplace, they
talked about the U.S., Europe, Japan, and the rest of the world…Now the ‘rest of world’
means the U.S., Europe, and Japan”. (Immelt, Govindarajan, & Trimbleet, 2009: 59)
This quote, which is taken from an article co-authored by Jeffrey R. Immelt, the
chief executive officer (CEO) of General Electric, illustrates the general understanding
emerging among both practitioners and scholars that the future of international business
lies in emerging countries. In fact, double-digit economic growth is currently an
emerging country phenomenon and in the past year, for the first time in history, foreign
direct investment flows were greater to developing economies than developed economies.
Emerging countries are estimated to contribute to the global economic growth more than
developed countries (the former 57% as opposed to the latter 43%) during 2010-2020
(Accenture, 2012), while their multinationals have already begun to outgrow and
outperform their developed country peers (Boston Consulting Group, 2011).
As emerging countries and their firms grow and become integrated to the rest of
the world, however, their institutions remain fundamentally dissimilar to those of
developed countries (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Peng,Wang, & Jiang, 2008). This makes the
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impact of emerging country institutions on international business outcomes conspicuous
(Peng et al., 2008), and increases the need to understand the institutions in emerging
countries. Consequently, emerging countries and their institutions now preoccupy both
international business practitioners and scholars (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Immelt et al.,
2009; Kostova et al., 2008; Peng et al., 2009). In fact, the impact of institutions in
emerging countries on business practices and strategy have been the main driving force
behind the development of the field of international business in the last decade (Peng et
al., 2008).
Despite the considerable advances to date, two factors have inhibited progress in
our understanding of the relationship between emerging country institutions and
international business outcomes. First, institutions have been generally treated as
exogenous regulative, normative, and cultural constraints that determine the behavior of
individuals and organizations. In this regard, studies on the interior cognitive that explain
how actors make sense of and respond to the external constraints, have been rare.
Consequently, international business scholars have not been able to address how
multinationals’ and their decision makers’ evaluations of, and hence responses to,
emerging country institutions vary. Second, instead of understanding the emerging
country phenomena in its local form, scholars have superimposed their pre-existing
theoretical tools (which were originally developed to explain the relationship between
institutions and business outcomes in Western contexts) on emerging country contexts
(Tsui, 2007; Whetten, 2009). In this sense, institutional differences across countries have
been regarded as differences in degree, rather than differences in kind (Jackson & Deeg,
2008). As a result, Western market-oriented institutions are taken as the norm, and the
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emerging country institutions that diverge from this ‘norm’ are implicitly or explicitly
attached negative labels such as deviant, inferior, inefficient, etc. The outcome is that
international business scholars have been preoccupied with objectively measuring the
distance between two countries, as well as the impact of the costs associated with this
distance on multinationals, which is known as liability of foreignness. As a result, the
attempts in the field to formulate predictions with respect to how multinationals and their
decision makers develop appropriate responses to emerging country institutions, and
successfully navigate through these environments, have been rare.
This essay addresses these voids in the international business literature by
providing a fresh perspective in studying such a prevalent emerging country phenomenon
as political connectedness. Drawing from the institutional logics approach, my
dissertation demonstrates that patrimonial logic and bureaucratic logic do not necessarily
represent fundamentally dissimilar rules according to which the game is played, but they
are rather guidelines that help actors to successfully play games that are fundamentally
dissimilar. Therefore, the more firms’ decision makers understand the patrimonial logic
prevailing in emerging countries - besides the bureaucratic logic prevailing in their home
countries -, the better they get at playing the dissimilar game in emerging countries, and
hence the less liability of foreignness they face.
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Table 3.1: Two perspectives on political connectedness
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Definition

Political Connectedness as Corruption
“Abuse of public power for private gain”

Political Connectedness as Strategy
“Managers’ personal ties with government
officials” (Peng & Luo, 2000)

Goal

Social endorsement, legitimacy

Economic performance, competitive advantage

Labeling of political
connectedness

Corruption
Bribery

Framing of political
connectedness

“Threat” to legitimacy

“Political networks” (Peng, 2003)
“Political ties” (Li, Zhou, & Shao, 2009)
“Political capital” (Yiu & Lau, 2008)
“Opportunity” to gain competitive advantage

General firm
strategy

Compliance, isomorphism

Acquisition of non-market capabilities

Specific firm
strategy

Avoid political connectedness

Increase political connectedness

Table 3.2: Institutional sensemaking of political connectedness
Literature on Corruption
Logic

Bureaucratic logic

Attention
Interpretation

Compliance
Legal and moral aspects
“Threat” to legitimacy

Strategy

Avoid political connectedness
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Literature on Political
Connectedness
Patrimonial logic
Performance
Economic and relational aspects
“Opportunity” to gain economic
benefits
Increase political connectedness

Table 3.3: Sample of expatriate managers by location, industry, and nationality
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Identity
Expatriate manager A
Expatriate manager B
Expatriate manager C
Expatriate manager D
Expatriate manager E
Expatriate manager F
Expatriate manager G
Expatriate manager H
Expatriate manager I
Expatriate manager J
Expatriate manager K
Expatriate manager L
Expatriate manager M
Expatriate manager N

Location
Beijing
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Beijing
Beijing
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Beijing

Industry
Business consulting
Commercial photography
Textile
Automobile wholesale trade
Business consulting
Architectural consulting
Business association
Medical equipment wholesale
Investment consulting
Retail e-commerce
Entertainment
Logistics
Translation services
Legal consulting

Nationality
American
American
American
American
American
American
Canadian
Canadian
Australian
Australian
British
German
Japanese
Singaporean

Table 3.4: Sample sentences used for coding
Attention focus
Legal and moral aspects
“…the first thing it goes against most
countries’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
it goes against my country’s, it goes
against the US’s. So we know that kind of
behavior is unethical, and immoral.”

Interpretation
Threat framing
“…This [political connectedness] is just
temporary. You see in China the
government changes a lot. One day you
are still the Mayor, but maybe the next
day you get arrested, you never know.”

- Expatriate manager J
Economic and relational aspects
“…helping [government officials] means
that you are more likely to get favors in
return. Access to markets. They are
[hiring people like Xiaoqiang] because of
access to markets.”
- Expatriate manager I

- Expatriate manager C
Opportunity framing
“The more connections you have with the
government, the better.”
- Expatriate manager M
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Micro
(Organizational/
Individual)

Attention

Interpretation

Action

Figure 3.1: Micro-level model of sensemaking, adapted from Daft & Weick (1984)
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Interpretation
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Figure 3.2: Cross-level model of institutional sensemaking

Action

Macro
(Society)

Bureaucratic logic
vs.
Patrimonial logic

Rule of law
vs.
Rule of men

Learning
Logics

Micro
(Organizational/
Individual)

Attention
Legal/moral vs.
economic/relational

Enacting
Logics

Interpretation
Threat vs.
opportunity

Strategy
Avoid vs. increase
political
connectednesss

Figure 3.3: Model of institutional sensemaking of political connectedness
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Bureaucratic
Hybrid
Patrimonial
Logic
Logic
Logic
(White area) (Gray area) (Black area)

Figure 3.4: Blend of patrimonial logic and bureaucratic logic
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CHAPTER 4
INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS, MANAGERIAL SENSEMAKING, AND
INTERNATIONALIZATION STRATEGY: MANAGERIAL ATTENTION
AS THE COGNITIVE UNDERPINNING OF FIRM’S STRATEGIC
RESPONSES TO DISSIMILAR INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS OF FIRMGOVERNMENT INTERACTION

When a firm is domestic, its operations are contained within a single home
country, and therefore it is subject to relatively homogeneous pressures from the
institutional environment (Nadkarni, Herrman, & Perez, 2011; Roth & Morrison, 1992).
If the firm’s operations transcend its home country, however, then it faces complex and
diverse institutional pressures, unlike those found in the home country. Multinationals, in
this sense, operate in an environment characterized by complexity, ambiguity, and
equivocality (Kostova et al., 2008). Therefore, top management of multinationals has the
critical task to provide meaningful interpretations for patterns of ambiguous information
they receive (Thomas et al., 1993). Consequently, the imposition of meaning on complex
and ambiguous strategic issues by managers, in other words, managerial sensemaking,
have come to the forefront of internationalization strategy (Caproni, Lenway, & Murtha,
1992; George et al., 2006; Nadkarni & Perez, 2007).
The role of managerial sensemaking becomes particularly paramount where
competition in emerging countries is considered (Dhanaraj & Khanna, 2011; George et
al., 2006; Peng, 2003). These countries lack the bureaucratic logic that Western

85

businesses typically rely upon, such as the formal regulatory and legal frameworks that
encourage predictable patterns of behavior (Tracey & Phillips, 2011). As a result, the
“rules of the game” are not known, or constantly changing in these countries (Peng,
Wang, & Jiang, 2008), which creates a great deal of uncertainty for the decision-makers
of firms (Spicer et al., 2000). The absence or weakness of bureaucratic logic that makes
and enforces the rules of market competition is known as institutional voids in the
international business literature (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). It has been argued that the
way managers make sense of these voids determines whether they recognize and try to
work around them, or they overlook and seek to avoid them (Dhanaraj & Khanna, 2011;
George et al., 2006).
In this regard, previous research on the relationship between institutional
differences and internationalization strategy has demonstrated that when firms from
developed countries in which bureaucratic logic is prevalent enter into emerging
countries in which patrimonial logic is prevalent, they face an institutional environment
that requires different strategies and capabilities to compete. This situation represents a
hazard, and might lead these firms to avoid, or at least to reduce commitment in emerging
countries (Henisz & Delios, 2001; Feinberg & Gupta, 2009; Phillips et al., 2009; Yiu &
Makino, 2002; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). In this study, I extend this literature by drawing on
the institutional research that emphasizes the socio-psychological foundations of
institutional processes (George et al., 2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009). I argue that the
strategic responses of developed country firms to institutional differences are not based
on objective evaluations, but are rather based on how their decision-makers perceive,
interpret, and act upon them (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002). Specifically, I focus on
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attention as the cognitive process through which managers of developed country firms
make sense of dissimilar institutional logics. The literature shows that attention patterns
of managers influence firm’s strategic responses by shaping the way managers notice and
make sense of their environment (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Levy, 2005; Nadkarni &
Perez, 2007). Drawing on this, I argue that multinationals are more likely to expand into
1) emerging countries when their top management pays more attention to the institutional
environment; 2) developed countries when their top management pays more attention to
the market environment. Those who direct their attention more towards the institutional
environment will be are more likely to develop the strategies and capabilities required by
patrimonial logic. In other words, these managers have better cognitive capabilities to
comprehend the “rules of the game” (North, 1990: 3), and “sense and seize opportunities”
(Teece, 2007: 1341) in emerging countries. Those whose attention is limited to the
narrow market environment, however, are less likely to develop the strategies and
capabilities required by patrimonial logic. When they face an institutional system in
which patrimonial logic is prevalent, they are more likely to see threats, rather than an
opportunities (Dhanaraj & Khanna, 2011), and hence are less likely to “play the game” in
emerging countries.
This paper’s approach to internationalization strategy has two theoretical
implications. First, it contributes to the international management literature that focuses
on the institutional similarities/differences between home and host countries as the main
determinant of internationalization strategy (Berry, Guillen, & Zhou, 2010; Phillips et al.,
2009; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). By examining the cognitive underpinning of
internationalization strategy, I explain why firms, despite being embedded in the same
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institutional environment and being subject to the same institutional pressures, take
different strategic actions. I argue that internationalization is not just an automatic
response to objectively measurable institutional differences, but is rather a consequence
of how the decision makers of firms make sense of these institutional differences. Which
issues managers give priority to, or focus their attention on, influences the way they
interpret institutional differences, and this in turn influences the strategic actions they
take. From this perspective, internationalization can be seen as much a question of
strategic decision making as of institutional processes.
Second, this paper contributes to the institutional theory by highlighting the
cognitive underpinnings of strategic responses to institutional logics. Despite being the
socio-psychological foundation that institutions rest on (DiMaggio, 1997; Meyer &
Rowan, 1977; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Zucker, 1983), cognition has for the most part
eluded institutional researchers (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). The general tendency in
institutional research has rather been to make self-serving attributions to cognition by
looking merely at the organizational outcomes (Scott, 2008). This study, on the other
hand, involves a direct examination of managerial cognition through the measurement of
attention patterns, which can be seen as a step towards revealing the micro-foundations of
institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).

4.1 Internationalization as a strategic response to dissimilar institutional logics
Research in international management has extensively studied the impact of
institutional differences on country choice strategy. An important finding of this literature
is that institutional differences between home and host countries make
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internationalization less likely (Berry et al., 2010; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Henisz
& Delios, 2001). From an institutional theory perspective, this can be explained by the
legitimacy issue. In this regard, institutional differences between two countries affect
internationalization success by posing legitimacy challenges for the multinational
(Hillman & Wan, 2005; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Lu & Xu, 2006). Especially a large
institutional distance severely diminishes multinational’s odds for growth and survival in
the host country, and consequently deters it from investing in that country:
“…Firms will refrain from investing in markets that are institutionally
distant, because business activities in those markets require conformity to
institutional rules and norms that conflict with those of the home country.”
(Xu & Shenkar, 2002: 614)
Where internationalization from developed countries into emerging countries is
considered, as is the case in this study, the dissimilar patrimonial logic prevalent in
emerging countries have the same effect as large institutional distance does (Phillips et
al., 2009). In this sense, firms from developed countries intrinsically employ market
strategies and market capabilities to compete in rule-based, stable environments
supported by bureaucratic logic (Peng, 2003; Wan, 2005). Emerging countries, on the
other hand, are characterized by uncertainty caused by weak bureaucratic logic (Spicer et
al., 2000). This prevents developed country firms from pursuing market strategies and
taking advantage of their market capabilities (Henisz, 2003). Patrimonial logic in these
countries thus requires firms to employ strategies to manage the institutional environment
rather than the market environment. However, many firms in developed countries are not
equipped with the skills, knowledge, and mindsets required to pursuit these strategies
(Dhanaraj & Khanna, 2011). The incapacity to address institutional differences thus
poses significant challenges to developed country multinationals.
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This argument has been supported by previous research, which demonstrates that
developed country firms tend to respond to patrimonial logic by avoiding entry into
emerging countries (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Feinberg & Gupta, 2009; Henisz &
Delios, 2001). These firms rather expand into other developed countries with similar
institutional environments, which enable them to utilize their market capabilities. Despite
providing useful insights into firm internationalization, this institutional account of
internationalization fails to address the mechanisms through which institutional
differences cause strategic responses. This is a “deficiency” in institutional theory that
scholars still attempt to mitigate in current institutional work (Scott, 2008). As explained
earlier, a direct examination of the cognitive processes that mediate between institutions
and strategic responses is needed to address this gap, which is the primary objective of
this study.
Furthermore, strategic response approach to internationalization has traditionally
focused on organizations and has neglected managers’ role in formulating organizations’
strategic responses. This issue has recently started to receive attention from institutional
scholars as current work in institutional theory is reconciling with the old institutionalist
perspective (Selznick, 1957). As a result, managers come to be regarded as the actual
bearers of the shared understandings within the organization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991;
Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997). The implication is that how organizations “think” becomes a
matter of how their key decision-makers “think” (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009), and this is
what ultimately shapes organizational responses.
Moreover, firms that internationalize their operations typically operate under the
jurisdiction of a diverse set of institutions, including dissimilar national environments that
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are composed of multiple and -as in the case of emerging countries- emerging
organizational fields. This environment poses a sharp contrast to the highly structured
environment that is assumed by institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer &
Rowan, 1977). The international environment thus provides firms and their decisionmakers considerable latitude for the interpretation of institutional pressures, which results
in heterogeneous strategic responses among firms.

4.2 Managerial Attention
At least since Simon’s early work (1945), we have known that individuals focus
their attention on selected aspects of a situation due to their cognitive limits. Selective
attention thus leads to the exclusion of competing aspects, which might result in an
alternative behavior. In this respect, “what decision-makers do depends on what issues
and answers they focus their attention on.” (Ocasio, 1997: 186). The implication of this
for firms is that firm behavior may as well be a function of how managers distribute their
attention across strategic issues surrounding the firm.
Attention, in this sense, is defined as the noticing, encoding, interpreting, and
focusing of time and effort by organizational decision-makers (Ocasio, 1997: 189). This
view of attention goes beyond simply paying attention to something (Levy, 2005). It is in
fact a cognitive process with regard to managerial sensemaking. But how does attention
affect strategic responses to institutional differences?
As explained earlier, managers direct their attention on a limited set of elements
of their environment. In this respect, two environmental domains are identified in the
extant literature (Bourgeois, 1980; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Roth & Morrison, 1992):
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general environment and market environment. The former is bounded by country
parameters (Roth & Morrison, 1992), and thus includes the institutional environment,
e.g., social norms, widely-held beliefs and taken for granted assumptions in a country
(Scott, 1995). Market environment, on the other hand, is the typical research context in
strategic management. It resembles the notion of industry in the industrial organization
paradigm as it is composed of customers, suppliers, competitors, technology, and as well
as laws and regulations (Bourgeois, 1980). Managers can narrowly focus on sectors in the
market environment or can scan broadly across different components of the general
environment. I argue that these attention patterns affect how managers make sense of
institutional voids, and thus influence the firm’s strategic response to them.

4.3 Hypotheses
According to the view of attention that is adopted in this paper, attention provides
a lens through which managers identify strategic issues and make strategic decisions
(Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). In other words, attention is a sensemaking process through
which managers construct a line of action for the firms they run. The implication is that
unequal managerial attention across firms to different aspects of the environment should
lead to different interpretations of environmental pressures, and naturally, to different
strategic responses (Dutton & Duncan, 1987). This is the main idea of this paper.
This idea has been supported by the empirical results. Nadkarni and Barr (2008)
find that attention to the market environment positively affects the speed of strategic
responses to the events in the market environment, whereas it negatively affects the speed
of the strategic responses to the events in the general environment. Levy (2005)
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documents that firms are more likely to develop an expansive global strategic posture
when their top management pays attention to the external environment and considers a
diverse set of elements in this environment. Thomas et al. (1993) report that managers
interpret strategic issues that they pay more attention to as positive and controllable, and
such interpretations in turn enhance the potential for top managers' taking strategic
change actions. On the other hand, they find less attention is associated with the
interpretation of issues as negative and uncontrollable, which in turn makes strategic
change actions less likely. Kaplan (2008) shows that CEO attention to a new technology
is associated with subsequent increases in a firm’s investment in that technical domain.
D’Avenni and McMillan (1995) find that managers of successful firms attend to critical
success factors in firm’s external environment while those of failing firms deny focusing
on these factors and instead direct their attention to firm’s internal environment. Cho and
Hambrick (2006) document that a shift in managerial attention caused by deregulation
leads to a change in firm strategy.
This literature, despite revealing the cognitive underpinnings of strategic
responses, focuses to a large extent on the domestic and the market environment, and
hence ignores strategic responses to the demands of the institutional environment. For a
purely domestic firm operating in a developed country, a focus on the market
environment may suffice to gain competitive advantage, as the prevalent bureaucratic
logic maintains rule-based market competition. Where emerging countries are concerned,
however, it is well established that the role of the institutional environment becomes
conspicuous (Peng et al., 2008). Considering this, it can be argued that expansion into
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emerging countries requires attention to different strategic issues than those required by
domestic competition.
In this regard, I argue that expansion into emerging countries requires managers
to shift their attention focus from the market environment to the institutional
environment. Absence or weakness of bureaucratic logic means that markets to work the
same way in these countries as they do in developed countries, which reduces the
effectiveness of market strategies (Peng, 2003). An attention focus on the institutional
environment, in this regard, will enable managers to recognize the institutional
differences across countries, which will make them more likely to modify their market
strategies accordingly. As a result, they will be more likely to address the challenges
stemming from institutional differences and hence decide to internationalize.
In this sense, more attention to the institutional environment is associated with
richer institutional knowledge, which allows managers to construct better interpretations
of institutional differences and envision more alternative responses to them. On the other
hand, more attention to the market environment, due to cognitive limits, will mean less
attention to the institutional environment. This will translate into poor knowledge of
patrimonial logic, which will hinder managers’ ability to develop non-market strategies
required to respond to institutional differences. This will narrow down the opportunity set
envisioned by managers, and hence will discourage them from expanding into emerging
countries. Thus;

Hypothesis 1: Managerial attention to the institutional environment will be
positively related to firm expansion into emerging countries.
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Hypothesis 2: Managerial attention to the market environment will be negatively
related to firm expansion into emerging countries.

On the other hand, I argue that entry into developed countries does not require
different attention patterns than those of domestic competition. This is because a strong
bureaucratic logic that underpins market competition is commonly shared by all
developed countries. Although there may be differences in the “strength” of bureaucratic
logic, “the rules of the game” do not really change when a develop country firm enters
into another developed country. Strong bureaucratic logic, in this sense, provides a
foundation on which a similar market competition, “the same game”, takes place. For this
reason, managers need to focus their attention on the market environment to understand
the industry dynamics and the formal institutional environment, and develop market
strategies to respond to this environment. On the other hand, managers do not need to pay
attention to the institutional environment, as it does not significantly change across
developed countries. In short, developed country firms do not need to gain knowledge of
patrimonial logic when they expand into another developed country. Besides, more
attention to the institutional environment will correspond to less mental resources and
less effort spent on analyzing the market environment, which will hinder firm’s ability to
expand into developed countries. Thus;

Hypothesis 3: Managerial attention to the market environment will be positively
related to firm expansion into developed countries.
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Hypothesis 4: Managerial attention to the institutional environment will be
negatively related to firm expansion into developed countries.

4.4 Methodology

4.4.1 Sample
The sample for this study was drawn from the COMPUSTAT database. Three
criteria guided the sampling of US manufacturing firms. First, the sample was limited to
global industries only. I drew on the extant literature to identify global industries
(Nadkarni et al., 2011; Samiee & Roth, 1992; Zou & Cavusgil, 2002). Within such
industries, industry structure transcends national boundaries, creating similar markets
across countries. According to industrial organization paradigm, firms in these industries
are under more competitive pressures and hence tend to pursue global strategies. This
suggests that market environment should be paramount for managers of these firms if
they are to internationalize, whereas institutional differences across countries should
receive little or no attention as a firm is assumed to find itself in the same industry
environment, regardless of the country it enters. However, I argue in this paper that
industry environment is embedded in the institutional environment, and as the institutions
of a potential host country differ from those of the home country, managers need to pay
more attention to the institutional environment. Only then managers can make sense of
the institutional differences and identify opportunities in an institutionally distant
country. I contend it is this cognitive process that is the primary driver of
internationalization choices. If the results of this study support this argument for firms in
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global industries, then the findings can be easily generalized to firms in other industries,
since managers in multi-domestic and transnational industries are under more pressures
to adapt their strategies to local contexts and hence are more likely to focus their attention
on the institutional differences between countries.
The second criterion that guided sample selection was firm size. I chose firms
whose sales exceeded $100 million. This reduced the amounts of missing data as there is
little publicly available data for smaller firms. Third, because young firms are in
transition and their cognition is unstable, I focused on firms that were at least 10 years
old (Barr, Stimpert, & Huff, 1992; Nadkarni & Perez, 2007). These criteria yielded 152
firms operating in 18 industries. Finally, I used data from 2004 to 2007 to measure the
dependent variables, and one year lagged values for all independent and control variables,
which aimed to address reverse causality issues.

4.4.2 Data sources for eliciting managerial cognition
Following the extant strategic cognition literature (Cho & Hambrick, 2006;
Kaplan, 2008; Levy, 2005; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008), I used CEO’s letters to shareholders
published in the annual reports to measure their attention patterns. I collected annual
reports from Mergent Web Reports, as well as from firms’ official websites.
A major criticism of the use of letters to shareholders is that they may be used by
managers as tools for impression management, and thus may not reflect their cognitions.
Yet, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), now one of the leading organizations for
corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting, defines CEOs´ statements as one of the
most important parts of the CSR reports (Castello & Lozano, 2011). As argued by the
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GRI G3, the CEO/President’s letter reports on the organization’s strategy. Such letters
state manager’s priorities with regard to firm’s internal and external environment, and
how they affect firm strategy. In other words, these letters define the strategic lines of the
firm and can in fact considered one of the most representative parts of the reports
(Abrahamson & Amir, 1996).
There is also plenty of evidence in the business literature suggesting that letter to
shareholders can be a reliable data source for the measurement of managerial cognition.
For instance, Fiol (1995) compared public and private documents generated by
executives in the forest products industry and found that non-evaluative cognitions—
attribution of control—were significantly correlated across these two types of documents.
D’Aveni & MacMillan (1990) similarly demonstrated that measures of top managers’
cognitions drawn from the letters to shareholders were highly correlated with measures
derived from other types of data. Even in the institutional literature (in which decoupling
is a central concept), Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) found striking correspondence
between public and private statements of the accounting firms they studied. In short,
statements in letters to shareholders can safely be seen as an indirect indicator of the
cognitive representations of managers from the sample firms.

4.4.3 Measuring Attention
I obtained data regarding managerial attention patterns by using word counts from
letters to shareholders. Word count has been employed in several studies to measure
managerial cognition (Cho & Hambrick 2006; D’Aveni & MacMillan 1990; Kaplan,
2008; Levy, 2005). A coding list was developed mostly from the ground up. I selected the
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phrases and words referring to each element of the environment after manually coding
several letters. I continued manual coding until I stopped coming across new phrases and
words. After the coding list was complete, I used the “Text Search” option in NVivo to
obtain the word counts for the whole sample. I used the proportion of the keywords in a
letter to shareholder to measure how managerial attention is distributed across the firm’s
environment. Table 4.3 shows a sample of these keywords used for automated coding.

4.4.4 Independent variables
Attention to market environment and attention to institutional environment. I drew
on the extant frameworks of the task environment (Bourgeois, 1980; Daft et al., 1988) to
identify the concepts related to the market environment. I classified words and phrases
related to competitors, suppliers, customers, and the regulatory environment under the
market environment.
I used Scott’s (1995) and North’s (1991) framework of institutions to identify the
words and phrases related to the institutional environment. I categorized words/phrases
referring to social norms, ethics, corporate social responsibility, under the socio-cultural
environment, whereas I classified the words/phrases regarding politics under the political
environment.
In order to calculate the proportion of the key words, I used the coverage ratio
provided by NVivo. This ratio gives the average of the percentage of characters coded —
as text selections— and the percentage of the page area coded —as region selections—.
Thus, this ratio provides a control for the length of the letter to shareholder.
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4.4.5 Dependent variables
Internationalization. The number of subsidiaries has been widely used in the
international business literature to measure the degree of internationalization (Dau, 2013;
Lu & Beamish, 2004; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). Thus, I capture expansion into emerging
countries with the number of subsidiaries the firm has in emerging countries, and entry
into developed countries with the number of subsidiaries the firm has in developed
countries. In regards to categorization of countries, there is no established convention for
the designation of "developed" and "developing" countries or areas in the United Nations
system. IMF’s classification of advanced economies does not seem to reflect the common
practice, as its current grouping includes countries such as Czech Republic, Slovenia, and
Slovakia, which have been treated as transition economies by scholars and practitioners
alike. Therefore, I mainly use the conventional categorization of developed countries that
consists of the U.S., Canada, Western European countries, Australia, New Zealand, and
Japan (Makino, Lau, & Yeh, 2002). However, I slightly modify this by moving Israel,
Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea to the developed country category, considering
that they have been some of the highest income countries in the world during the past
decade. Besides, I treat the Canadian subsidiaries of the sampled firms as domestic
subsidiaries and thus do not include them in the measurement of the dependent variable.

4.4.6 Control variables
I controlled nine variables that are commonly known to affect
internationalization: firm age, firm size, slack, R&D intensity, advertising intensity,
export intensity, product diversification, firm international experience, and past
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performance (Kirca et al., 2011; Lu & Beamish, 2004; Kim et al., 2010). Due to data
availability issues regarding firm’s international experience, I could not use the
conventional measure of the number of years of international investment history (Henisz
and Delios, 2001). Therefore, I created a categorical variables to measure firm’s
emerging country experience and firm’s overall international experience: As of 2002, if a
firm had had a subsidiary in a foreign country; 1) for 10 years or more, the variable was
labeled as “vast international experience”, and took the value of 2; 2) for less than 10
years, the variable was labeled as “limited international experience” and took the value of
1. If the firm did not have a subsidiary in a foreign country as of 2002, the variable was
labeled as “no international experience” and took the value of 0. Similarly, if a firm had
had a subsidiary in an emerging country as of 2002; 1) for 10 years or more, the variable
was labeled as “vast emerging country experience”, and took the value of 2; 2) for less
than 10 years, the variable was labeled as “limited emerging country experience” and
took the value of 1. If the firm did not have a subsidiary in a foreign country as of 2002,
the variable was labeled as “no emerging country experience” and took the value of 0.
Since this study emphasizes the role of managers and their sensemaking in
determining firm’s internationalization strategy, I also controlled for the effect of the
manager’s background characteristics, such as prior experience in emerging countries and
overall international experience. I defined international experience as the number of years
spent on higher education and on work assignments abroad (Nadkarni & Perez, 2007). As
for emerging country experience, I use a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
CEO worked or studied in at least one of the emerging countries. I used I measured firm
size by the logarithm of the total employees. I used the ratio of liabilities to assets to
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measure slack. For R&D intensity, I used R&D expenditures over sales. To measure
advertising intensity, I used the ratio of advertising expenditures to sales. I capture export
intensity with the ratio of exports to sales. As for product diversification, I used entropy
measure, which is calculated as:
Degree of product diversification = ∑i [Pi x ln(l/Pi)],
where Pi is the sales attributed to segment i and ln(l/Pi) is the weight given to each
segment, or the natural logarithm of the inverse of its sales. Past performance was
measured as the return on sales in the prior year. Finally, I controlled for the industry
effects by using the two digit Standard Industry Classification Codes (SIC). In the
sample, firms were distributed across seven industries, so I used six dummy variables. I
derived all the firm-level data from the COMPUSTAT database, whereas I obtained the
data regarding managerial background characteristics from Dun and Bradstreet’s
Reference Book of Corporate Management, as well as from biographies published in
Businessweek.

4.5 Results
The means, standard deviations, and correlations are reported in Table 4.4. To
check for a potential problem of multicollinearity, I used variance inflation factor
analysis. The scores ranged from 1.13 to 4.03, which was well below 10, thus
multicollinearity was not a problem in the regression analysis (Hair, Anderson, Tatham,
& Black, 1998).
Table 4.5 contains the negative binomial regression results testing the hypotheses.
Model 1 shows the effects of firm size, firm age, R&D intensity, advertising intensity,

102

slack, product diversification, export intensity, CEO international experience and past
performance on firm expansion into developed countries, after controlling for the 7
dummy industry variables. R&D intensity and advertising intensity, the commonly used
proxies for market capabilities that are accepted as the primary drivers of
internationalization in the literature (Kirca et al., 2011), have significant and positive
effects in this model.
In model 2, we see the effect of the same variables on firm expansion into
emerging countries. The effects of R&D intensity and advertising intensity are again
positive and significant, suggesting that market capabilities drive internationalization also
into emerging countries.
Model 3 reports tests of Hypothesis 3 and 4. In this full model, attention to market
environment is positively related to entry into developed countries (p>0.05), which
supports Hypothesis 3. However, the effect of attention to institutional environment is not
significant (p<0.1). As a result, hypothesis 4, which posited a negative relationship
between managerial attention to the institutional environment and firm entry into
developed countries, is not supported.
In model 4, attention to institutional environment is positively related to firm
expansion into emerging countries (p<0.05), which provides support for hypothesis 1.
The effect of attention to market environment is, however, not significant (p<0.05). As a
result, hypothesis 2, which predicted a negative relationship between attention to market
environment and entry into emerging countries, is not supported.

103

4.6. Discussion
At least since Oliver’s (1991) seminal work, institutional scholars have known
that organizations engage in active and interest-seeking behavior in response to
institutional pressures. In other words, organizations can develop strategic responses to
these pressures rather than passively yielding to institutional pressures in a uniform
manner. This approach was a significant contribution to the earlier versions of
institutional theory, because it explained the heterogeneity in organizational behavior
despite the pressures for conformity and homogeneity. However, since this perspective
treats the nature and the context of the institutional pressures as the main determinant of
strategic responses, it does not address how organizations that are subject to identical
pressures vary in their responses.
The objective of this study is to address this void in the literature by highlighting
the role of individual sensemaking in determining organization’s strategic responses to
dissimilar institutional logics. By directly examining the cognitive processes through
which managers make sense of their environment, I show that institutional differences
between countries do not automatically lead to a choice between internationalization and
no internationalization. The pressures stemming from institutional pressures are rather
interpreted, given meaning, and responded to by the key decision makers of organizations
(Dacin et al., 2002; George et al., 2006). In this regard, theory and findings of this study
provide evidence supporting the theoretical arguments of the current work in institutional
research, which views sensemaking at the individual level is a source of agency, as well
as the main reason behind the heterogeneous strategic responses (George et al., 2006;
Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Powell & Colyvas, 2008).
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Another contribution of this paper to institutional theory is its approach to
uncertainty caused by weak bureaucratic logic. Since Meyer and Rowan (1977),
institutional scholars have equated underdeveloped formal institutions with weaker
pressures for conformity. Oliver (1991) similarly proposed that organizations will resist
institutional pressures when the level of institutionalization is low. However, some recent
institutional research has come to view the lack of institutionalization in emerging
countries as an opportunity for more active institutional strategies, even for institutional
entrepreneurship (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009, Tracey & Phillips, 2011). In this
respect, firm expansion from a developed country to an emerging country provides a
different context to analyze organizations’ strategic responses to dissimilar institutional
logics. It shows that organizations can take advantage of the weak bureaucratic logic only
if their decision-makers have the sensemaking capabilities to navigate through an
institutional system dominated by patrimonial logic.
This work follows in the footsteps of George et al. (2006) and Kennedy and Fiss
(2009), who drew on upper echelon theory and threat-rigidity hypothesis (Staw et al.,
1981) to extend Oliver’s (1991) model of strategic responses to institutional pressures.
Integrating neo-institutional theory with cognitive science, this study provides a new
conceptualization of the relationship between institutional distance and
internationalization strategy. It offers a fresh perspective in studying internationalization
by emphasizing the special role of managerial cognition in mitigating the difficulties
arising from institutional differences.
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4.7 Implications and further research
There is a general understanding among economists that internationalization
(FDI) happens when firms (investors) feel secure, but we do not really know what makes
them feel secure (Rodrik, 2006). This study can also be seen as an attempt to address this
issue. In this regard, further research should study other cognitive processes than
attention that shapes the way firms make sense of institutional differences, as well as how
this sensemaking influences their subsequent action. Only then can we understand the
real dynamics and processes of internationalization.

4.8 Conclusion
In this study, I drew on Xu and Shenkar (2002) and Phillips et al. (2009) to study
internationalization as a strategic response to institutional differences between home and
host countries. However, I integrated this line of work with the recent developments in
institutional research that studies cognition as the micro-foundation of institutions
(George et al., 2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009). By directly examining managerial
sensemaking through attention focus, this study explains why there is a diversity of
strategic responses among developed country firms to the patrimonial logic prevalent in
emerging countries. The findings support the hypothesis that managerial attention to the
market environment is positively related to firm expansion into developed countries,
whereas, managerial attention to the institutional environment is positively related to firm
expansion into emerging countries. I thus conclude that the variation in managerial
attention focus on market and institutional environments is the cognitive underpinning of
strategic responses to dissimilar institutional logics.
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Table 4.1: Firm’s external environment
Market Environment

General Environment

Competitors

Demographic Environment

Customers

Macro-Economic Environment

Suppliers

Socio-Cultural Environment

Legal/Regulative Environment

Political Environment
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Institutional Environment

Table 4.2: Global industries in which sampled firms operate
SIC Code
2086
2100
2834
2844
3533
3562
3570
3571
3577
3651
3674
3711
3714
3721
3728
3844
3845
3861
3873

Industry
Bottled & canned drinks
Soft drinks & carbonated water
Pharmaceuticals
Cosmetics
Oil Field Machinery
Ball and roller bearings
Computers & office equipment
Electronic computers
Computer peripheral equipment
Household audio and video equipment
Semiconductors
Automobiles
Automotive parts
Aircraft
Aircraft parts
X-Ray apparatus
Electromedical apparatus
Photographic equipment
Watches and clocks
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Table 4.3: Samples of keywords used for automated coding
Market Environment
Competitors

Customers

Suppliers

Institutional Environment

Competitor

Customer

Supplier

Legal/
Regulative
Law

Acquisition

Market

Supply chain

Regulation

Barriers to
entry

Consumer

Raw material Legislation

Socio-Cultural

Political

Ethics

Government

Corporate
citizenship

State agencies

Social
responsibility

Policymakers
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Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics and correlations
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Variable

Mean

S.D.

1

1. Entry into
developed countries

10.12

18.99

2. Entry into
emerging countries

4.53

10.89

0.92***

3. Firm age

30.41

15.94

0.49***

0.47***

4. Firm size

1.69

1.66

0.62***

0.56***

5. R&D intensity

0.11

0.15

6. Advertising
intensity

0.02

0.04

0.09*

0.13**

7. Slack

0.49

0.29

0.09*

0.09*

0.18***

0.33***

–0.07

0.38***

8. Past performance

0.11

0.15

0.11**

0.11**

0.21***

0.18***

–0.35***

0.07

9. Product
diversification

0.33

0.45

0.28***

0.22***

0.32***

0.30**

–0.14**

–0.13**

10. Export intensity

0.02

0.09

–0.04

11. CEO international
experience

1.98

5.29

0.16***

0.15***

0.06

0.13**

12. CEO attention to
inst. environment

0.09

0.15

0.27***

0.26***

0.21***

0.34***

13. CEO attention to
market environment

1.69

1.48

0.01

0.02

–0.01

2

–0.02

–0.07

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

0.63***
–0.21***

–0.13**

–0.04

–0.00

–0.08

–0.07

–0.06

–0.01

–0.06

0.00
0.15***
–0.05
0.16***

–0.22***
0.05

0.04

–0.04

–0.12**

0.11*

–0.03

0.01

0.03

0.08

–0.00

–0.07

0.02

0.17***

0.05

0.04

–0.01

0.02

–0.00

0.03

–0.01

0.00

–0.06

–0.04

–0.00

Summary statistics for the industry, CEO emerging country experience, and firm international experience variables are not included to
save space.
N= 423. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

Table 4.5: Results of analyses of managerial attention focus on internationalization
choices
Independent
Variables

Intercept

Model 1
Entry into
developed
countries
3.47***

Model 2
Entry into
emerging
countries
4.49***

Model 3
Entry into
developed
countries
3.14***

Model 4
Entry into
emerging
countries
4.29***

Firm age

1.85***

1.69***

1.87***

1.65***

Firm size

4.23***

5.14***

4.12***

5.15***

R&D intensity

1.43***

0.58*

1.27***

0.42

Advertising intensity

0.67***

0.79***

0.68***

0.77***

Slack

-0.39*

0.06

-0.39

0.67

Past performance

1.50***

0.28

1.44***

0.15

Export intensity

0.14

-0.01

0.09

-0.04

Product diversification

-0.24***

0.18***

-0.27***

0.17***

CEO international
experience
CEO attention to
market environment
CEO attention to
institutional
environment
N
*p < 0.05
**p < 0.01
***p < 0.001

1.23***

0.68***

1.23***

0.62***

0.76***

0.17

0.19

0.65*

425

423

425

423
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